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RESUMO ESTENDIDO
O desenvolvimento de sistemas ele´tricos e eletroˆnicos permitiu a mas-
sificac¸a˜o do uso de dispositivos eletroˆnicos programa´veis para comando
e controle de operac¸o˜es de sistemas te´cnicos. Tais dispositivos possibil-
itaram o desenvolvimento de sistemas te´cnicos mais complexos, pore´m,
devido a essa elevada complexidade, observou-se um aumento de aci-
dentes causados por falhas inerentes ao controle de tais sistemas. Para
se reduzir esses acidentes, foram criadas normas te´cnicas para sistemas
de controle, cuja aplicac¸a˜o seja relevante a seguranc¸a, o que deu origem
a` seguranc¸a funcional. Seguranc¸a funcional refere-se a` seguranc¸a que
e´ mantida atra´ves do correto funcionamento de um sistema te´cnico.
Diferentes segmentos industriais tem aplicado o conceito de seguranc¸a
funcional, para criar ma´quinas e sistemas mais seguros. No setor de
construc¸a˜o de ma´quinas, o uso de func¸o˜es de seguranc¸a reduz o nu´mero
de acidentes de trabalho, ao evitar que operadores, mantenedores e pes-
soas ao redor fiquem expostas aos perigos inerente das ma´quinas. As
normas te´cnicos impo˜e requisitos quantitativos e qualitativos sobre os
sistemas de controle de seguranc¸a. A norma te´cnica internacional IEC
61508 definiu um framework para quantificac¸a˜o de seguranc¸a funcional.
Para cada setor industrial, normas espec´ıficas foram baseadas baseadas
na IEC 61508. Esse framework e´ bem adequado para componentes
ele´tricos e eletroˆnicos. Pore´m, na a´rea de maquina´rio industrial, sis-
temas de controle sa˜o realizados na˜o somente com tais componentes,
mas tambe´m por componentes mecaˆnicos, pneuma´ticos e hidra´ulicos,
os quais apresentam um comportamento diferente de falha. Tais com-
ponentes sa˜o considerados pela norma te´cnica internacional ISO 13849.
No entanto, os me´todos de quantificac¸a˜o desta norma conte´m fortes
limitac¸o˜es e na˜o sa˜o completamente compreendidos pelos usua´rios. Este
trabalho dedica-se ao estudo da norma te´cnica internacional de segu-
ranc¸a funcional no setor de construc¸a˜o de ma´quinas industriais, a ISO
13849. O foco do estudo e´ a quantificac¸a˜o de falhas f´ısicas de compo-
nentes. Falhas f´ısicas sao quantificadas atrave´s de indicadores proba-
bil´ısticos, sendo objeto de estudo da engenharia de confiabilidade. No
primeiro cap´ıtulo, desenvolve-se o conceito de seguranc¸a funcional. O
conceito e´ explorado como um todo, como uma ferramenta de reduc¸a˜o
de riscos, e posteriormente como esse conceito e´ aplicado no setor de
construc¸a˜o de ma´quinas. O apeˆndice A complementa o cap´ıtulo 1 com
a estrutura legal no que diz respeito a` seguranc¸a de ma´quinas na Eu-
ropa, definido pela Diretiva Europeia de Ma´quinas, da qual a norma
te´cnica ISO 13849 faz parte. Ainda no cap´ıtulo 1 sa˜o identificadas as
principais linhas de pesquisa, e o objetivo do trabalho e´ enunciado. Este
trabalho, feito em parceria com a Bosch Rexroth, tem como objetivo o
desenvolvimento de um me´todo que possibilite a quatificac¸a˜o de ı´ndices
de confiabilidade para seguranc¸a funcional utilizando distribuic¸a˜o de
Weibull. No segundo cap´ıtulo, conceitos ba´sicos para a compreensa˜o do
trabalho sa˜o apresentados. Os primeiros conceitos relacionam-se com
conceitos da engenharia de confiabilidade, com o objetivo de esclarecer
conceitos como probabilidade, confiabilidade, probabilidade de falha e
construir o conceito do ı´ndice utilizado pela ISO 13849, a frequencia
me´dia de falhas perigosas por hora, PFH. O apeˆndice B complementa
esse cap´ıtulo, com uma explicac¸a˜o intuitiva do que e´ medido atrave´s do
PFH. Neste cap´ıtulo tambe´m e´ apresentada a distribuic¸a˜o de Weibull,
bem como me´todos de ca´lculo de PFH. Os paraˆmetros para ca´lculo
do PFH segundo a ISO 13849 sa˜o apresentados e explicados. No ter-
ceiro cap´ıtulo e´ apresentado como se e´ calculado o PFH atrave´s de
simulac¸a˜o a eventos discretos. Um me´todo para ca´lculo do PFH con-
siderando distribuic¸a˜o de Weibull, para estruturas simples e estruturas
redundantes, correspondendo a`s categorias B, 1, 3 e 4 da norma te´cnica
ISO 13849. O apeˆndices C desenvolve a equac¸a˜o para determinaa˜o do
nu´mero mı´nimo de simulac¸o˜es para se alcanc¸ar o resultado desejado, e
o apeˆndice D desenvolve as equac¸o˜es utilizadas pelo me´todo proposto
para estruturas redundantes com falha de componentes seguindo a dis-
tribuic¸a˜o de Weibull. Os resultados para os casos de comparac¸a˜o com
a ISO 13849 sa˜o apresentados no apeˆndice E. No quarto cap´ıtulo e´
apresentado um exemplo de aplicac¸a˜o do me´todo proposto em uma
ma´quina hidra´ulica simples do Laborato´rio de Sistemas Hidra´ulicos e
Pneuma´ticos (LASHIP), da Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
(UFSC). A determinac¸a˜o do PFH e subsequentemente do PL e´ real-
izada atrave´s do procedimento dado pela norma e pelo me´todo pro-
posto. Utilizando-se o me´todo proposto, foi poss´ıvel calcular PFH para
intervalos de utilizac¸a˜o diferente do considerado pela ISO 13849, bem
como reconhecer o efeito do desgaste do componente, caracterizado
pela distribuic¸a˜o de Weibull. No quinto cap´ıtulo e´ apresentado uma
visa˜o geral de como integrar o ca´lculo de PFH com distribuic¸a˜o de
Weibull com o processo de desenvolvimento de uma ma´quina, baseado
em experieˆncia com a Bosch Rexroth. No cap´ıtulo de conclusa˜o e´ anal-
isado o potencial de se realizar ana´lises mais realistas, e as limitac¸o˜es
do me´todo proposto, sendo adequado apenas para ma´quinas o subsis-
temas produzidos em se´rie, devido ao requerimento de dados de campo
para extrair os paraˆmetros da distribuic¸a˜o de Weibull para cada com-
ponente. Analisa-se tambe´m como que a pesquisa desenvolvida se en-
caixa na linha de pesquisa explicitada no primeiro cap´ıtulo, e qual a
relevaˆncia para o cena´rio brasileiro. Adicionalmente, sugesto˜es para
trabalhos futuros sa˜o feitas.
Palavras-chave: Seguranc¸a funcional, ISO 13849, Confiabilidade, Sis-
tema de controle de ma´quina

ABSTRACT
The IEC 61508 standard series defined a framework for quantification
of functional safety. For each particular industry sector, specific stan-
dards are being developed based on it. This framework is well suited for
electrical and electronic components. However, in the field of machin-
ery, control systems are realized not only by such components, but also
by mechanical, pneumatic and hydraulic components, which exhibit a
different failure behavior. Such components are considered by the ISO
13849 standard. However, quantification methods of this standard are
still not quite well understood by the users, and have strong limita-
tions. This work presents a study an alternative method of how to
calculate the average frequency of dangerous failures (PFH), required
by ISO 13849 in order to achieve a Performance Level (PL). This alter-
native method includes modeling safety functions as Reliability Block
Diagram and evaluation of PFH using the software BlockSim, through
Discrete Event Simulation. Modeling hypothesis and limitations are
discussed. The proposed method enables calculation of the standard’s
cases, as well as consideration of different failure distributions, of which
Weibull distribution is considered. A study case considering Weibull
distributed failures is presented. Applicability of the method is also
discussed.
Keywords: Functional Safety, ISO 13849, Reliability, Machine control
system
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the growing complexity of automated systems, there has
been an increase in the number of severe accidents causing great com-
motion. A crash-landing in San Francisco in 2013 (TRAUFETTER,
2013), overexposure to Cobalt-60 in San Jose in 1996(IAEA, 1998), a
crash-landing without steering capabilities in Iowa in 1989 (NTSB, 1990)
and the radiation overdoses caused by the machine Therac-25 in 1985
(LEVESON, 1995) are some examples of disasters triggered by failures
in the control system. Physical failures of components, software bugs
and interaction of environmental and operation conditions cause the
system to behave in an unexpected and undesired way.
Technical systems do not cause only big accidents. Machines
are also responsible for a great number of work accidents, that while
not so disastrous, they are certainly much more frequent and have
huge losses as well. According to the Annual Report of the Brazilian
Social Security (MINISTe´RIO DA PREVIDeˆNCIA SOCIAL, 2014), ca. 717.9
thousand work accidents, of which approximately 555.1 thousand were
typical work accidents1. From the total amount of work accidents,
industry is responsible for 45.48% of accidents.
Our society benefits of such dangerous system. In order to enable
safely operation of such dangerous systems, it is therefore mandatory to
reduce risks of accidents. Systems have to be designed not only to fulfill
their intended function, but also to avoid unsafe conditions, processes
failures and instabilities. Different design measures can be used for
that, what are called safety barriers. Safety barriers are physical and
non-physical means of preventing, controlling and mitigating accidents
(SKLET, 2006).
A single safety barrier would ideally prevent all accidents. How-
ever, safety barriers can be designed to prevent only foreseeable acci-
dents, may have design flaws and other failures that impair its correct
operation. From this reason, different safety barriers are combined to
reduce even more the chance of an accident.
Figure 1, adapted from Rausand (RAUSAND, 2014), represents a
model for an accident. A source of hazard is contained by safety barri-
ers. “Holes” in barriers represent unforeseen conditions or failures. A
1Due to Brazilian law 8213/91, occupational diseases and traffic accidents be-
tween workplace and residence are also considered work accidents and are counted
in the statistics by the National Institute for Social Security, the Instituto Nacional
do Seguro Social, INSS.
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hazardous situation, caused by the hazard source, is an potential acci-
dent, that is to be contained by a safety barrier. A hazardous situation
is seen as a demand for the safety barrier. Through “holes” in each
barrier, demands are reduced to next barriers, until the last barrier,
where remaining hazardous situations can lead to an accident. It is of
interest of safety engineering to quantify how big are such “holes”.
Figure 1 – Accident model and prevention of accident through safety
barriers. Adapted from (RAUSAND, 2014)
1.1 FUNCTIONAL SAFETY
Not every safety barrier is implemented in the same way, or has
the same effect on the technical system. A safety barrier can be isolation
through fences or housing of a hazard source, can be a procedure in case
of emergency or can be an automatic system.
A classification of safety barriers is given by Sklet (SKLET, 2006),
and represented in figure 2. A first classification is whether a safety
barrier is active or passive. To passive safety barrier belong, among
others, fences and safety inherent design concepts. To active barriers
belong, among others, automatic systems for accident avoidance and
calling firefighters, for example.
Following figure 2, an automatic system for accident avoidance is
implemented by a technical system, opposing to an administrative bar-
rier, as calling firefighters or having special procedures for emergency
situations. For technical systems, that implement a safety barrier in an
active manner, it is said that this system implements a safety function.
A safety function is therefore a sub-group of safety barriers.
Functional safety is the denomination to the knowledge area that
deals with safety functions.
From the perspective of an automatic system, function means an
action or set of actions that this system performs in order to achieve
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a desired effect to an external environment, as exposed by De Negri
(NEGRI, 2005). A first attempt then to understand functional safety
is to think of a function of a dedicated control system to reduce risks
inherent of a process or a system. These terms are better described
through the next chapter.
Figure 2 – Safety barrier classification. Adapted from Jin(JIN, 2013)
Functional safety is characterized by the active operation of a
system, in order to maintain the safe condition. A general structure
of a safety function is represented in figure 3. The safety function has
to detect the dangerous condition or event, decide what is the suitable
reaction, and act in the system or process, what is called a safety loop.
Figure 3 – Functional blocks of a safety function
An example of functional safety is an emergency shutdown sys-
tem of a chemical plant. A special system monitors pressure of a
pipeline, and in the case of over-pressure (over safe limits), due some
problem or instability, this special system takes over and shut down the
plant, or a part of it, to avoid accidents to happen (RAUSAND, 2014).
1.2 FUNCTIONAL SAFETY IN THE MACHINERY SECTOR
Workplace accidents involving machinery normally do not have
large proportions like the above mentioned, although they are much
more frequent. Together with high costs, there is intention to increase
30
workplace conditions and to reduce accidents. In the field of machinery,
the European Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC (EUROPEAN PARLIA-
MENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2006) has as-
signed machine builders the responsibility of providing a safe machine.
They became liable for accidents caused by an unsafe machine. In
Brazil, the revision of the Norma Regulamentadora 12 - NR12 (MIN-
ISTERIO DO TRABALHO E EMPREGO, 2013) in 2010 pursues the same
objective.
The Machinery Directive defined a legal framework for safety, as
well as Essential Health and Safety Requirements. Its fulfillment has
to be adopted in the European countries as law. Technical standards,
whose application is not mandatory, provide solutions to design of safe
machines. There are different measures that can be adopted. Func-
tional safety is one of them. For a deeper discussion on the Machinery
Directive, refer to appendix A.
Safety functions in the machinery sector mostly prevent access
to moving parts, or to avoid accidents before they occur. While in the
case of process industry, where a safety system monitors operational
parameters and acts in the case of a deviation, in the machinery sector
safety functions control directly the hazards (e.g moving parts) and can
steer them to a safe state when the presence of a person is detected.
The scope of functional safety in the machinery sector is to re-
duce risks of hazards arising from unexpected, unpredictable and un-
controllable movements.
As an example, consider a machining center, as described by
”10 Steps to Performance Level” (ORTH et al., 2012). The working
area, where the cutting tools move, is protected by a door. The door
protects persons entering the hazardous area, i.e. where the cutting
tools can move. If some opens the door, the cutting tools have to stop,
in order to prevent an accident. The safety function, in this case, is
stop machine tool movements, triggered by opening of the door.
A second example, considering the same machine, is setup of
work-pieces. In this case, it is assumed that is necessary to keep the
door open, while moving the cutting tool. In order to reduce risks of
accidents, the cutting tool shall move at reduced speed. The safety
function, in this case, is moving with reduce speed, triggered by a
special operation mode. The safety-related system must monitor the
tool speed, for the case a failure causes the tool to move faster than
allowed. If this happens, machine tool movements must stop, in order
to maintain the overall safety.
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1.3 PERFORMANCE OF SAFETY FUNCTIONS
The indiscriminate use of a safety function does not alone guar-
antee the avoidance of the accident. In order to be effective, it has
to be carefully designed. Sklet (SKLET, 2006) defines different ways
of evaluating a safety barrier or a safety function. Among them, the
performance measure of interest for this work are:
• Effectiveness
• Integrity
Effectiveness is related to the behavior of the safety-related part
of the system, whether the reaction is suitable or not, and if all con-
ditions or events were considered. In other words, it is equivalent to
the question: “Does the (safety) system do the right thing?” A safety
function has to be described in a document, in terms of what are its
requisites, when it shall act (whether continuous or to react an event),
its response times, the reaction, the safe state that it should bring the
system, etc.
Integrity is related to its robustness against failures (of the safety
function), and in the case of a failure, how the safe state is maintained.
In other words, it is equivalent to the question: “Can the safety system
do the right thing?” Integrity is quantified in terms of probabilistic
indicators and complementary requirements.
Integrity is impaired by, among other causes, failures of safety
components and faults and errors of safety software. These causes have
different nature and affect the safety function in different ways. There-
fore, a classification between fail-to-function causes is proposed in figure
4. A first differentiation is made whether the safety function failed to
function due to a component failure or a software ERROR. This dif-
ferentiation between the sources of incapability of the safety function
reflects whether the system has lost the capability of controlling/acting
due to lack of “hardware” or if it has the “hardware” but does not react
in a proper way.
A further differentiation of the fail-to-function cause is possible,
as shown in figure 4. For component failures, a distinction between
early, random and wear out failures is made. This differentiation is
explored in the next sections. A differentiation between software errors
and systematic failures is illustrative and as they do not influence in
the quantification, they are not further explored in this work.
This differentiation reflects in the safety assessment to each
cause. Component failures are quantifiable by probabilistic indicators.
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Software errors and systematic failures are qualitatively assessed.
For the quantifiable failures, two commonly used probabilistic
indicators are:
• Average probability of failure on demand - PFDavg
• Average frequency of dangerous failures - PFH
These measures are better explained in Chapter 2 and in ap-
pendix B. Together with complementary requirements, these measures
define integrity levels, which are determined by standards.
1.4 FUNCTIONAL SAFETY STANDARDS
Due to its criticality, an important characteristic of functional
safety is its regulation by standards. Standards provide design princi-
ples, qualitative requirements, procedures for determination of PFDavg
and PFH, checklists, guide the documentation and define target val-
ues for integrity measures, which enables comparison between different
systems and solutions (GOBLE, 2010).
Menis and Buja (BUJA; MENIS, 2012) say that ”functional safety
standards focus on the characteristics of the means added to a system to
ensure its safety, where the means are constituted by hardware and/or
software devices. The added means are commonly termed extra systems
since they are not necessary to deliver the intended service, apart from
the safety.”
There are a number of different standards, each one intended to
a different sector. The first standard was the IEC 61508, whose first
version was issued in 1998, and was revised in 2010. This standard sets
a general framework for functional safety, which was adapted to differ-
ent sectors, given birth to sector-specific standards. The IEC 61508 has
Figure 4 – Classification of failure types
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7 parts, and defines a safety life cycle concept, where integrity of safety
functions is planned, designed and maintained through the process or
system life (Quality Management System for Safety) (RAUSAND, 2014).
As each standard adopts its own terms, confusion may arise, spe-
cially when the scope of application lies between two standards. While a
safety system is called Electrical/ Electronic/ Programmable Electronic
(E/E/PE) Safety-related Systems in the IEC 61508, in the process in-
dustry it is called Safety Instrumented System (SIS), in the machinery
industry by Safety Related Electrical Control System (SRECS) by IEC
62061 and Safety Related Parts of Control System (SRP/CS) by 13849.
Automotive industry refers to the safety system as Electrical and Elec-
tronic Safety-related system, while in nuclear industry it is called by
Instrumentation and Control System. For the target measures, Safety
Integrity Level (SIL), Performance Level (PL) and Automotive Safety
Integrity Level (ASIL) are used.
A brief comparison between the functional safety standards is
given in the table 12, as a tentative of clarification.
Table 1 – Comparison between nomenclature of different industry sec-
tors functional safety standards
Standard Sector Denomination of the control
system
Target measure
IEC 61508 General framework E/E/PE Safety-related system SIL
IEC 61511 Process industry SIS SIL
IEC 62061 Machinery SRECS SIL
ISO 13849 Machinery SRP/CS PL
ISO 26262 Automotive E/E Safety-related system ASIL
IEC 61513 Nuclear Power I&C system -
The focus of this work is the standard ISO 13849. Therefore, its
terms are adopted from now on.
1.4.1 Functional safety of machinery - ISO 13849
In the field of machinery, safety standards started to be devel-
oped before the IEC 61508. The first machine safety standard was the
EN 954 in 1996, which had a qualitative approach to ensure the in-
2The standards listed in the table are issued by international committees as ISO
and IEC, and are widely accepted in Europe. Some other country are adopting
these standards as well, as Brazil, through the ABNT. In the USA, the IEC 61511
is adopted as ANSI/ISA 84.00.01 about Safety Instrumented Systems for process
industry
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tegrity of the controls of machinery, based in the years of experience
in design. The concept of category was created, which described the
behavior of the control system in presence of a fault (LERe´Ve´REND,
2008).
A large number of machine specific standard were developed un-
der this concept of categories, what has made it a successful standard.
Machine builders had standard solutions for the safety of control sys-
tems. However, there was no mention to programmable systems, which
should be designed following the recommendations of the predecessor
of IEC 61508.
Publication of IEC 61508 had a huge impact in many industry
sectors. It defined what is known today as functional safety. It triggered
efforts to bring these concepts and techniques to the machinery sector.
The IEC 62061 is the application of the IEC 61508 framework to the
machinery sector, with a more detailed approach requiring mastery of
reliability evaluation techniques. However, this approach is limited to
electrical, electronic and programmable components.
Approximately at the same time, an European project called
Standards for Safety Related Complex Electronic Systems - STSARCES
(DORRA; REINERT, 2000) made an investigation in complex electronic
and programmable systems for the machinery sector. It was an attempt
to achieve a SIL for the categories of EN 954.
In 2006, ISO 13849 was published, based on findings of the
STSARCES project. It maintained much of the structure of the EN
954 while introduced reliability concepts and calculation. Due to the
number of machine standards that were already based on the EN 954,
ISO 13849 conserved the structure of categories, while introduced sim-
plified and customized reliability estimation methods. The standard
remained therefore compatible with the old machinery standards, and
provided an easier way to estimate the integrity of a safety function
in the design phase. These factor made it very popular and widely
accepted.
The ISO 13849 is a standard on functional safety for the machin-
ery sector. It defines five Performance Levels - PL, named from a to
e, being e the level with highest integrity. The PL is defined in terms
of qualitative and quantitative requirements. Referring to figure 4, it
can be roughly said that quantitative requirements relate to reduction
of component failures, while qualitative for reduction of software errors
and systematic failures. For the quantitative, the PFH has to be cal-
culated. The table 2 shows the correspondence of PFH to PL. For a
graphical representation of range of PFH values and correspondence to
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PL, see figure 5.
Table 2 – Assignment of Performance Level according to PFH
Performance level (PL) Average Frequency of Dangerous Failure per Hour (PFH)
a ≥ 10−5 to < 10−4
b ≥ 3 · 10−6 to < 10−5
c ≥ 10−6 to < 3 · 10−6
d ≥ 10−7 to < 10−6
e ≥ 10−8 to < 10−7
Figure 5 – Graphical representation of table 2
To calculate the PFH, ISO 13849 states that standard’s user may
calculate it, or use the simplified method presented by the standard.
This simplified method consists of estimating some parameters of the
safety function, related to the function’s architecture, reliability of its
components and to detection of failures. These parameters are input to
the table K.1 of ISO 13849 (International Organisation for Standardization,
2006), which provides pre-calculated PFH. The process of parameter
estimation and determination of PFH according to ISO 13849 is ex-
plained in chapter 2.
1.5 LIMITATIONS OF FUNCTIONAL SAFETY
While functional safety is the natural technological development
of the safety systems, there are criticism and questions to be answered.
The most important questions are explored in this section.
A first question that arises is whether the statistical approach
does really make systems safer. There is much effort in determination
of PFDavg and PFH, and it is not known whether this effort really
reduces accidents in the machinery sector.
Rausand (RAUSAND, 2014) brings a list of open research ques-
tions. Among them, software and systematic reliability quantification
and estimation of common cause failures stand out as of most impor-
tance.
Goble (GOBLE, 2010) brings the question about the quality of
reliability methods. Without rational data, calculation methods cannot
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deliver meaningful results.
Schaefer and Bork (SCHAERFER; BORK, 2007) recognize that
quantification can bring benefits, but has to be regarded skeptically.
Users should be able to understand how the reliability numbers of com-
ponents are produced. Components that are frequently operated are
normally subjected to aging and wear failure mechanisms, whereas com-
ponents that remain long periods inactive are subjected to collapse of
tribological system and electrochemical corrosion. Such different failure
mechanisms have different failure distributions and parameters.
Due to lack of experienced in safety and reliability, some de-
signers tend to give much importance on the quantification and less
importance to safety principles and qualitative requirements. Due to
the market pressure, SIL and PL has been seen as a “quality seal”, be-
coming a product feature and a marketing point. Users, seeking only
to fulfill numbers, demand for components for functional safety that
claim to be “certified”. This critic is reinforced by Schaefer and Bork
(SCHAERFER; BORK, 2007).
Functional safety are not the only type of safety barrier to be
applied, but they are the most complex, demanding more engineering
effort. Therefore, there is a false impression that complying to the func-
tional safety standards is enough to achieve a safe system or process.
1.6 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF FUNCTIONAL
SAFETY
Focus of most of academic research is related to IEC 61508 and
IEC 61511. Jin (JIN, 2013) identified the institutes that contribute
more to development of functional safety.
One demand of functional safety users, in the field of machine
construction, is better understanding of the terms and quantities, and
examples of application. In this sense, many companies publish book-
lets giving overview of requirements, procedures for application of the
standard and examples.
In the field of original research and development, there are not
many works. Jocelyn (JOCELYN et al., 2014) present an study of applica-
tion of ISO 13849 in a machine for laboratory use. Focus of the work is
to provide an application example and explore variation of parameters
for calculation of PFH.
Bosch Rexroth company has taken a position of developer of
original research in functional safety for machinery, in the context of
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ISO 13849. The first publication is a paper from Orth and Barg (ORTH;
BARG, 2010) explaining the impacts of reliability metrics for machine
builders. Following this publication, comes the book 10 Steps to Perfor-
mance Level, in which a methodology for implementation of ISO 13849
is presented, comprising both qualitative and quantitative require-
ments. Further publications are Orth and Raksch (ORTH; RAKSCH,
2014) for source of reliability data for functional safety, where use of
Weibull distribution is suggested to be used when field failure data is
available. These publications show that Bosch Rexroth is investing in
inclusion of reliability methods in quantification of functional safety,
for the machinery building sector.
Other publications of Bosch Rexroth are from Orth, Swagten and
Silva (ORTH; SWAGTEN; SILVA, 2014), regarding reliability and func-
tional safety for Oil industrym and from Mikelsons and Su, regarding
fault injection simulation with Modelica for validation of functional
safety (MIKELSONS; SU, 2014).
1.7 MOTIVATION OF THE PRESENT WORK
For the machinery sector, one of the major issues is the quantifi-
cation of PFH considering mechanical, pneumatic and hydraulic com-
ponents. IEC 61508 and IEC 62061 consider only electrical and elec-
tronic components, whose times to failure are randomly distributed
and well described by the exponential distribution. Referring to figure
4, it represents only random failures under component failures. This
characteristic allows PFH calculation through homogeneous Markov
process, which simplifies the problem.
Pneumatic, hydraulic and electromechanical components exhibit
predominantly wear out failure (refer to figure 4). For this reason, the
exponential distribution does not represent accurately failures of such
components. Weibull distribution is flexible enough to represent well
early, random and wear out failures, but does not allow PFH calculation
through homogeneous Markov processes.
Table 3 gives a summary of the types of components considered
by ISO 13849, as well as their most common reliability measure given by
manufacturers. The functional safety assessment framework developed
by IEC 61508 does not apply directly in these cases. This problem
is cited by Rausand (RAUSAND, 2014) and also by Orth and Raksch
(ORTH; RAKSCH, 2014).
3Hydraulic valves are also specified in number of cycles for non-safety applica-
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Table 3 – Typical reliability measures for common technologies in the
machinery sector
Technological group Reliability measure Failure distribution
Electrical Failure rates Exponential
Electromechanical Number of cycles to 10% of failure - B10 Weibull
Mechanical Number of cycles to 10% of failure - B10 Weibull
Pneumatic Number of cycles to 10% of failure - B10 Weibull
Hydraulic Mean time to failure3 Weibull
The solution used by ISO 13849 is to consider a limited analysis
interval and calculate an equivalent constant failure rate for this time
interval. This process in described in BGIA Report 2008/2e(HAUKE
et al., 2009) and by Schumacher (SCHUMACHER; Ru¨CKWART, 2014).
It consists of estimating the frequency of operating cycles, therefrom
the time to reach 10% of failed components can be also estimated.
A drawback of this approach is that the failure rate has a “expiration
date”. In order to keep the calculated PFH valid, the component has to
be changed after that time, because its failure rate is not valid anymore,
regardless if it is still in a good state.
A method for calculation of PFH with Weibull distribution is
desired. It relates to the development line of Bosch Rexroth, serving as
sequence to the work of Orth and Raksch (ORTH; RAKSCH, 2014) being
a further step on the use of Weibull distribution and analysis of field
failure data for functional safety.
Detailed calculation models would allow better representation of
electromechanical, mechanical, pneumatic and hydraulic systems. It
would be possible to investigate effects of slightly variations of archi-
tectures.
1.8 OBJECTIVE
The objective of this work is to develop a method that allows
calculation of average frequency of dangerous failures per hour (PFH)
for typical safety functions in the machinery sector considering compo-
nents with Weibull distributed failures.
tions. However, ISO 13849 gives standard values for hydraulic components if they
fulfill constructive principles.
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1.9 METHODOLOGY
This work has been developed in cooperation with Bosch Rexroth
AG. The company has a major role in the market of electro-hydraulic
components, and it is a leading company in the field of safety and
functional safety for machinery sector.
This project includes participation with Bosch Rexroth AG for
understanding the current market requirements of functional safety
products, as well as the limitations on the techniques available today.
Therefore, it is necessary to study the problem, the ways to resolve and
to implement it.
Bosch Rexroth aims at improving its processes and products to
the Machinery Directive and functional safety. A 6 Degrees-of-Freedom
Motion Simulation System was selected to be worked into this process.
As the design office and the design team for motion systems are
located in Boxtel, in the Netherlands, as well as a prototype, the project
was realized in loco. This project is based on the techniques developed
in Bosch Rexroth quality department.
The project can be divided in three phases:
1. Study and lectures regarding reliability at the Universidade Fed-
eral de Santa Catarina, UFSC;
2. Study of machine safety, functional safety and ISO 13849, and
proposal of method with Weibull, developed in Bosch Rexroth
Quality Management Department, in Wurzburg, Germany;
3. Project for further development of a motion simulation system
with integrated safety functions, in Bosch Rexroth BV, in Boxtel,
the Netherlands.
1.10 STRUCTURE OF THE WORK
In chapter 2, the theoretical background of risk, probabilistic
risk assessment, risk reduction is given. Additionally to that, reliabil-
ity measures used for functional safety are given. At the end, some
reliability concepts are given.
In chapter 3, a method for considering Weibull distribution for
failure of components is developed.
In chapter 4, a case study using the method is given. Results
are evaluated in this chapter.
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In chapter 5, an integration of the proposed method is made with
project activities for compliance to Machinery Directive in a engineering
project.
At the end of this work, conclusion and suggestions for future
works are presented.
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2 FUNCTIONAL SAFETY
As explained in the previous chapter, functional safety reduce
inherent risks of technical systems. Safety functions’ performance are
evaluated by qualitative and quantitative means. In order to enable this
evaluation, it is necessary to draw objective measures or framework for
quantification of risk and integrity of safety functions.
Much of the quantification techniques of functional safety comes
from dependability theory (BUJA; MENIS, 2012). The first section is
dedicated to define all the necessary concepts.
A formal definition for risk is given in the second section, as
well as a methodology for risk assessment in technical systems. This
methodology is used as basis for risk reduction in several industries,
including the machinery sector. In the sequence, it is explained how
to related reliability/dependability metrics to evaluate the amount of
risk reduction of a control system. After that, how this methodology
is applied in the machinery sector.
At the end, basic concepts about functional safety are given,
necessary to consider for ISO 13849.
Safety and Reliability are knowledge areas that are closely re-
lated. There are terms and definitions which are common to both
areas, making it difficult to separate them. In the following sections,
these terms are defined.
2.1 RELIABILITY ENGINEERING
For the assignment of performance level, PL to a safety function,
the ISO 13849 requires some qualitative and quantitative measures.
The quantitative are expressed in terms of the average probability of
dangerous failures per hour, PFH. This measure conveys expected life-
time of components, fault tolerance and fault detection, which are part
of reliability engineering.
Additionally, as this document focus in application of Weibull
distribution for quantification of safety functions, probabilities distri-
butions as exponential and Weibull are presented/explained.
The definitions of quantification follows the approach of Ku-
mamoto(KUMAMOTO; HENLEY, 2000). The symbols used the closest
as possible of the one used by IEC 61508-6 and ISO 13849.
Reliability is defined as the ability of an item to perform its
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intended function over a period of time under specified conditions
(BILLINTON; ALLAN, 1992). The numeric value of reliability means
the probability of an item surviving to the given time point.
In order to allow a better and common understanding, some
definitions are necessary, and are presented in the following.
Item is a general term meaning the object of the reliability anal-
ysis. It covers both system and component.
A component is an elementary object of the quantification anal-
ysis. It cannot be broken down in parts; it is indivisible. To denote
component, sub-index C is used.
A system is an item which is a collection (more than one) of
components. Quantification analysis of a system depends of the quan-
tification(reliability) of the items, as well as relations between them.
To denote system, sub-index S is used.
A function is the expected performance of an item. It is ex-
pressed in what the item shall deliver, and which variations of perfor-
mance are acceptable. A failure is an event when the system stops
delivering the intended function. A failure causes the item to go to a
failed state. An item can be either in the normal state, i.e. providing
the function, or in the failed state, i.e. not providing the function.
As an example, consider a hydraulic check valve1, as represented
in figure 6. Its function is to allow flow of hydraulic fluid in one direc-
tion, and to block flow in the opposite direction. If this valve allows
flow in both directions, or if blocks flow in both directions, the valve
suffered a failure and is incapable of performing its function.
Figure 6 – Schematic representation of a hydraulic check valve.
From the previous definition, it is possible to define failure
mode. It is the way (mode) in which an item fails. It means how the
failure occurs physically (DIAS et al., 2013). Considering the hydraulic
check valve, one failure mode is blocking flow in both directions; a
second failure mode is to allow flow in both directions.
Dangerous failures are those failure modes can cause harm or
impair the machine to react against a dangerous situation. Contrasting
1For an electrical counterpart, consider a diode, whose function is to allow electric
current in one direction, and to block in the opposite direction.
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to safe failures that cause the machine not to deliver the intended
function, but do not pose hazards. Safe and dangerous failures are
further explored in section 2.2.
A Repairable item means that after a failure, the same item
can deliver the intended function after a maintenance action, also
called repair.
A Non-repairable item means that it cannot deliver the func-
tion anymore, even after a maintenance action. The item has to be
discarded and replaced. In this work, systems are considered repairable
items, while components are considered non-repairable items. A repre-
sentation of repairable and non-repairable items is given in figure 7.
Figure 7 – Model for a a) non-repairable and b) repairable item.
Component reliability and system reliability configure two dif-
ference study areas. The first one is concerned with the physical mech-
anisms of failures, how to determine the reliability through laboratory
life tests or analysis of field failures and design modification to optimize
reliability of a component. System reliability is concerned with quan-
tification the reliability metrics of a system, allocation of components
to achieve a reliability goal, and to understand the relation between
them.
Reliability engineering is based on probability theory and ran-
dom variables. In the following sections, some concepts of reliability
engineering are detailed, in order to allow definition of evaluation met-
rics for functional safety. The random variable T denotes lifetime.
2.1.1 Cumulative Distribution Function
Is the probability of failure until a time t. In mathematical
terms, it is the probability that the random variable T is lower than
t. (That is, probability that a value for lifetime of an item chose at
random is lower than the limit t). It is denoted by F (t), and calculated
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by (BILLINTON; ALLAN, 1992):
F (t) = P{T < t} (2.1)
Where P stands for probability.
2.1.2 Survival Function
Is the probability of an item to perform its function (without
failing) until the time t2. It is denoted as R(t), called Reliability
Function, expressed by (BILLINTON; ALLAN, 1992):
R(t) = P{T > t} (2.2)
2.1.3 Probability Density Function
The concept of probability density function, PDF expresses the
instantaneous behavior of the probability. It is the quantification of the
failures by each time instant, normalized by the initial population. It
can be thought as the probability of failure per unit of time. The pdf
is denoted by f(t) and is calculated by (BILLINTON; ALLAN, 1992):
f(t) = dF (t)
dt
(2.3)
2.1.4 Failure rate
Failure rate3is one the most used reliability indicators
(BILLINTON; ALLAN, 1992).It is the number of items that will fail in the
next time instant [t, t + dt), given the number of items that have not
failed until time instant t. It is normally denoted by the Greek letter
λ and calculated by (BILLINTON; ALLAN, 1992):
λ(t) = N(t+ dt)−N(t)
Nsurvived(t)
(2.4)
2Mathematically, it is the probability that a value for lifetime T of an item picked
at random is higher than t.
3Some authors call this quantity by hazard rate or hazard function. This name
is avoided in this work, as it may cause confusion.
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Where N(t) stands for number of failures at time instant t and
Nsurvived(t) stands for number of items working at time instant t.
Alternatively, it can be calculated by the reliability function and
the pdf, as (RIGDON; BASU, 2000):
λ(t) = f(t)
R(t) (2.5)
Formally speaking, the failure rate is a conditional quantity.
That is, it is conditioned that the components have not failed until
the time point t of interest. However, due to the disseminated use
of the name failure rate, it is maintain in this document, without the
conditional.
2.1.4.1 Failure rate curve
The failure rate expresses a very important characteristic of
items. A plot of failure rate of items of its life shows a specific pat-
tern4. It can be seen in figure 8. This represents a initial phase of life
where components are much more prone to failure, due to weak design,
production flaws and assembly errors. Following that, there is a flat
region, where the failure rate is approximately constant, that accounts
for random failures, caused by random and unknown factors. At the
end, the item enters in a wear-out phase, where aging mechanisms start
to take effect and accumulated damaged start to make components fail
more.
This representation of different failure mechanisms is included in
figure 4.
2.1.5 Mean time to failure - MTTF
The Mean Time To Failure is a widely used concept in reliability.
Mathematically, it is defined as the expected value of the lifetime T ,
and calculated by the equation:
MTTF = E(T ) =
∫ ∞
0
tf(t)dt =
∫ ∞
0
R(t)dt (2.6)
The equation 2.6 applies to every distribution. However, MTTF
4The failure rate curve is often referred as hazard rate curve or bathtub curve.
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Figure 8 – Theoretical model of failure rate through the lifetime
has adopted a specific meaning in reliability engineering.
For the exponential distribution (see section 2.1.9), the failure
rate becomes constant, and it can be shown that MTTF equals the
inverse of the failure rate, as shown:
MTTF = 1
λ
(2.7)
Where λ stands for a constant failure rate.
Considering the bathtub curve, the middle region, called useful
life, can be modeled by the exponential distribution. In that sense,
it has been conventionalized that MTTF represents the inverse of the
failure rate during the useful life. In this case, it can assume very high
values (low failure rates), but once the item reaches the end of its useful
life and enters in the wear-out phase, the assumed value for MTTF is
not valid anymore.
2.1.6 BX% life
For components whose failures are mainly due to time- and use-
dependent failure modes, it is common to express reliability (or lifetime)
in terms of time to a certain percentage of failure.
This measure is denoted by BX , where X is replaced by the
percentage. In that way, B1 means 1%, B5 means 5%, B10, 10% and
47
so on.
For discrete components, i.e. components that operation is char-
acterized by two distinct states (e.g. open and closed) as pneumatic
valves and electromechanical switches, reliability is commonly mea-
sured in B10 cycles. This is interpreted as the number of cycles until
10% of the components have failed in life tests.
The B10 is mainly used for components operate in cycles. For
other components, whose operation is rather continuous, like bearings,
it is common to refer to L10, measured in (continuous) operating hours.
2.1.7 Unconditional failure intensity
The unconditional failure intensity, normally denoted by w(t), is
calculated by the number of items that will fail within the small interval
[t, t+ dt), given that the components were working at the beginning of
the test. It is calculated as:
w(t) = N(t, t+ dt)
N0
(2.8)
Where N0 is the number of items in normal condition at t = 0.
As this measure considers the whole population, even the failed
items, it becomes the same as the probability density function (pdf)
for non-repairable components. For repairable, it does not equal to the
probability density function nor to the failure rate.
2.1.7.1 Difference between failure rate and unconditional failure inten-
sity
Failure rate and unconditional failure intensity are normally con-
fused. In order to clarify these concepts, and the difference between
them, consider example in figure 9.
The failure rate λ(t) is calculated using equation 2.4, considering
only the items that have not failed until the time t:
λ(t) = 770 = 0.1 (2.9)
While the unconditional failure intensity w(t) is calculated using equa-
48
Figure 9 – Failure rate versus unconditional failure intensity. Adapted
from Kumamoto (KUMAMOTO; HENLEY, 2000). Time axis is not in
scale.
tion 2.8, considering the initial amount of items:
w(t) = 7100 = 0.07 (2.10)
2.1.8 Component reliability - Failure distributions
The component reliability is concerned in quantify the failures
of a single component. Reasons for that is to optimize design of a
component. The analysis is done mostly in the structural level, looking
at the physics of the failure. Objective is to understand how a particular
failure mode occurs, and to change the design to avoid such failures (or
even to avoid over-design).
2.1.9 Lifetime distributions - Exponential
The exponential distribution is the
The probability density function becomes:
f(t) =
{
λe
−tλ
, t > 0, λ > 0 (2.11a)
0, otherwise (2.11b)
The cumulative failure distribution becomes:
F (t) = 1− e−tλ (2.12)
The reliability distribution becomes:
R(t) = e−tλ (2.13)
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The failure rate becomes:
λ(t) = λ (2.14)
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Figure 10 – Probability Density Function of the Exponential distribu-
tion
2.1.10 Lifetime distributions - Weibull
The Weibull distribution is characterized by having no typical
shape. Its shape is defined by its parameters. Weibull distribution is
found in two forms: two-parametric and three-parametric. The three-
parametric distribution represents an additional lifetime with no fail-
ures, and it is of no interest for this work, therefore will not be consid-
ered. The two-parametric Weibull distribution has the parameters:
• Scale parameter, denoted here by η; and
• Shape parameter, denoted here by β.
The η parameter represents lifetime of an item. The higher the η
value, the longer the duration of an item. The β parameter represents
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whether failures tend to occur in the beginning, middle or the end of
lifetime. Failure rate of the Weibull distribution can represent each
of the three regions of the failure rate curve (refer to figure 8) and
therefore the three failure mechanisms of figure 4.
Due to its flexibility, the Weibull distribution is well-suited for
shape fitting applications, and therefore it is used for analysis of field
failures. The probability density function becomes:
f(t) =
{
β
η
(
t
η
)(β−1)e−(
t
η
)β
, t > 0 (2.15a)
0, otherwise (2.15b)
The cumulative failure distribution becomes:
F (t) = 1− e−( tη )β (2.16)
The reliability distribution becomes:
R(t) = e−(
t
η )
β
(2.17)
The failure rate becomes:
λ(t) = β( 1
η
)βtβ−1 (2.18)
2.1.11 Availability
Defined only for repairable items. It is the probability of an
item is normal at time t. It is denoted by A(t), and calculated by
(KUMAMOTO; HENLEY, 2000):
A(t) = P{Item is working at t} (2.19)
2.1.12 Unavailability
As availability, it is also defined only for repairable items. It is
the probability of an item is failed at time t. It is denoted by Q(t), and
calculated by (KUMAMOTO; HENLEY, 2000):
Q(t) = P{Item is not working at time t} (2.20)
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Figure 11 – Probability Density Function of the Weibull distribution
2.1.13 Repair rate
Repair rate is an analogous quantity as failure rate, but defined
for components that are failed and are repaired. Formally, it is the
probability that an item is repaired in the interval [t, t + dt), given it
is failed at t (KUMAMOTO; HENLEY, 2000). It is denoted by function
µ(t).
2.1.13.1 Mean Time To Repair - MTTR
As the MTTF, the Mean Time To Repair - MTTR, is the ex-
pected value of time to repair (KUMAMOTO; HENLEY, 2000)
For constant repair rate, i.e. µ(t) = µ, the relation is valid:
MTTR = 1
µ
(2.21)
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Figure 12 – Failure rate of the Weibull distribution
2.1.14 System reliability
System reliability has two objectives: quantify the reliability
metrics of a system, based on the values/figures of components, and
to understand the relation between them.
The problem of system reliability is the one of modeling a com-
plex engineering with a lot of components and their interactions be-
tween them. The objective of system reliability is to provide an answer
about the behavior of a system (beforehand) given the behavior (reli-
ability) of the components. Many other analysis come from that, like
analysis of importance of components, reliability allocation and so on.
2.1.15 Series and parallel configuration
Reliability modeling does not correspond necessarily with the
physical structure of a system. Reliability modeling takes the function
into account, and what are the components that contribute to the func-
tion. In that way, it becomes important to have a precise definition of
function.
53
When two (or more) components are necessary for a function,
they are modeled as in series configuration. Figure 13 shows a rep-
resentation of series system. If one of them fails, the complete system
fails.
RS(t) = RA(t) ·RB(t) (2.22)
Where RS(t), RA(t) and RB(t) denotes the reliability function for the
system, component A and component B, respectively.
A B
Figure 13 – Block diagram of a series system with two blocks
If two components realize the same function, and failure of one
is not enough to make the system fail, they are said to be redundant
and the system has a parallel configuration. Figure 14 shows a repre-
sentation of a parallel configuration. In this case, the reliability of the
system, based in the reliability of the components is given by:
RS(t) = RA(t) +RB(t)−RA(t) ·RB(t) (2.23)
Each chain of components realizing the function is called a chan-
nel. A series configuration is also referred as a single channel struc-
ture, while a dual channel structure means a parallel configuration.
A
B
Figure 14 – Block diagram of a parallel system with two blocks
Series systems have lower reliability than its components, while
parallel systems have higher reliability. If one of the components fail
in a redundant structure fail, the second can still provide the function.
The failures that affect one component do not affect the other, therefore
increasing the reliability of the system.
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2.1.16 Common Cause Failures - CCF
Usage of redundant components may improve the reliability of
a system, without having to increase the reliability of the component
itself. In the case of a failure of a component, the other one can still
deliver the function. This is due to the fact that failures are indepen-
dent and that causes of failure of one component do not cause the other
to fail. However, if the component are similar or equal to each other,
they are prone to fail due to same causes and/or stresses. This effect
reduces the gain in reliability when redundant structures are used.
Failures of redundant structures due to same causes are called
common cause failures - CCF, and modeling of such failures is impor-
tant to give a more realistic and not so optimistic reliability estimation
(BILLINTON; ALLAN, 1992).
2.1.16.1 Beta-factor model
The Beta-factor model divides the failure rate of each component
of a parallel structure into common-cause failure rate (two components
fail) and single failure rate (one component fails). This division is
made considering a multiplicative factor, called βCCF (GOBLE, 2010).
It assumes a value between 0 and 1, normally lower than 0.1 (lower
than 10%) (DORRA; REINERT, 2000).
Figure 15 – Representation of common cause failures with Beta-factor
Figure 15 a) represents a parallel structure with two equal blocks.
Each block has failure rate λ. Figure 15 b) a state transition diagram of
failure as figure 7, but considering two components in parallel structure.
If one fails, safety function is still provided by the second, what is
represented as the transition from “Ok” to “One channel failed” state.
However, a failure due CCF means a transition directly from state “Ok”
to “Two channels failed”, and the second component did have no effect
in increasing reliability of the system. Consideration of CCF adjusts
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failure rates for:
λnoCCF = λ · (1− βCCF ) (2.24)
While both blocks fail at the same time with failure rate:
λCCF = λ · βCCF (2.25)
2.1.17 Modeling and quantification of system reliability
There are different techniques for representing reliability of a sys-
tem, based on reliability of its components. Each modeling technique
has different properties; some focus more on the relation of components
itself, some on the system behavior. According to IEC 61508-6 (Inter-
national Electrotechnical Comission, 2010b), the more common techniques
are:
• Reliability Block Diagram - RBD;
• Fault Tree Analysis - FTA;
• Markov process;
• Monte Carlo simulation;
• Discrete Event simulation;
• Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets - GSPN.
There are plenty of literature about calculation of PFH with
each method and comparison between them. One of the most impor-
tant is the Annex B of IEC 61508 part 6 (International Electrotechnical
Comission, 2010b), which summarizes how to calculate PFD and PFH
with RBD, FTA, Markov process, Monte Carlo and other techniques.
For a comparison between all method, refer to the work of Rouvroye
(ROUVROYE; BLIECK, 2002). For an explanation of how to calculate
PFH with FTA, Markov process and GSPN, refer to the work of In-
nal et al (INNAL et al., 2010). Rausand (RAUSAND, 2014) has a good
compilation of calculation with different techniques.
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2.2 SAFETY OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
2.2.1 Risk
Risk is a concept associated with potential loss (or gain) of an
uncertain event. It is denoted by R and is calculated by:
R = S · P (2.26)
Where S stands for severity and P for probability of occurrence.
2.2.2 Ratio of dangerous failure
While in reliability engineering all the failures are a matter of
concern, in safety engineering only dangerous failure modes are of con-
cern.
Therefore, failure rates or MTTF must be corrected by a factor,
called ratio of dangerous failures. This factor is estimated by a Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), considering which failure modes
are dangerous for the system.
For ISO 13849, when no information regarding ratio of dangerous
failure is provided, it shall be considered as 50%.
2.2.3 Mission time
Mission time is the maximum allowed time for the safety-related
control system to operate. It is denoted as TM .
2.2.4 Average frequency of dangerous failure per hour - PFH
For safety standards, it is necessary to estimate PFH. It means
average frequency of dangerous failure per hour, and it is a character-
istic of a system, which depends, among other things, on the quality of
its components, the architecture, detection of failures and repair. For
an intuitive interpretation of PFH, see appendix B. It is defined by the
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IEC 61508-4 (International Electrotechnical Comission, 2010a) as:
PFH(TM ) =
1
TM
∫ TM
0
wS(t)dt (2.27)
Where PFH(TM ) is the average frequency of dangerous failure over the
interval [0, TM ), TM is the mission time and wS(t) is the unconditional
failure intensity of the complete safety function (system).
Estimation of wS(t) is done differently for each system reliabil-
ity method listed in section 2.1.17. Innal et al. (INNAL et al., 2010)
explains how to calculate PFH using FTA, Markov models and GSPN.
For this work, PFH is estimated by discrete event simulation. A deeper
explanation is given in section 3.4.
The PFH can be estimated by the average number of failures,
divided per time according to IEC 61508-6 (International Electrotechnical
Comission, 2010b). For Kumamoto (KUMAMOTO; HENLEY, 2000), the
expected number of failures is the integral over time of the uncondi-
tional failure intensity, as given:
E(N(TM )) =
∫ TM
0
wS(t)dt (2.28)
where E(N(TM )) is the expected value of the number of failures
in the interval [0, TM ). Algebraic manipulation of equations 2.27 and
2.28 leads to:
PFH(TM ) =
1
TM
E(N(TM )) (2.29)
With simulation, it is possible to calculate the average number
of failures, which is an estimate for the expected number of failures.
Therefore, equation 2.29 is used to calculate PFH.
2.3 FUNCTIONAL SAFETY FOR INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY -
THE ISO 13849
Many hazards arise from an improper behavior of the machine
and its moving parts. This behavior is controlled by the control system.
It is therefore necessary that the control system is properly designed,
in order to avoid such hazards. Safeguarding measures cannot block
the complete access to the hazardous parts of the machine (most of
the time, access should be granted for maintenance purposes). In these
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cases, it is necessary that safeguards can trigger the machine to go to
a safe state or have a safe behavior.
Typical safety function for the machinery sector defined by ISO
13849 (International Organisation for Standardization, 2006):
• Safety-related stop initiated by a safeguard;
• Manual reset function
• Start/restart function
• Enabling device function
• Prevention of unexpected start-up
• Escape and rescue of trapped persons
A safeguard, when properly designed, would remove the possibil-
ity of an accident to occur. However, due to complexity of the matter,
it is virtually impossible to consider all the cases and to ensure that the
control system has no design flaws. Nevertheless, it is also subjected to
failure of components.
If a component fails, the safety function is not available anymore
and an accident can occur due to an exposed hazard.
The simplified method for quantification of PFH for the machin-
ery sector relies in determining 3 parameters: category, MTTFd and
DCavg.
2.3.1 Categories
Category is a basic requirement for compliance to the standard.
Every safety function must be classified into a category, in order to be
assigned to a PL.
The category concept conveys the behavior of the function in
the event of a failure. It is strongly related to the structure of the
function, i.e. how the components are relate to each other. As there
are many possible structure variations, the standard described them in
abstract terms, so that a great variety of structure can be mapped into
few categories (International Organisation for Standardization, 2006).
Each category is represented in the standard by a designated
architecture. A designated architecture is a typical implementation
in block diagram that fulfills the requirements of each category. They
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should be considered a guide to the implementation, but not only the
unique solution to each category.
Each category requires an interval of values of MTTFd and
DCavg. Categories 2, 3 and 4, which have redundant channels, have to
fulfill additional requirements against common cause failures5, called
CCF for short.
2.3.1.1 Category B
This category is characterized by design of the safety function
according to relevant standards to the application and to withstand
operational stresses, influence of processed materials and environmental
conditions.
A failure of any component may cause the failure of the safety
function. A safety-related block diagram6of designated architecture for
category B is shown in figure 16.
Figure 16 – Graphical representation of designated architecture for cat-
egory B and 1. I stands for Input element, L for Logic and O for output
element.
Category B and its designated architecture (figure 16) can be
seen as a technical implementation of the behavior of figure 3. An
example for a category B safety function is an interlock sensor in a
door of a machining center, triggering a signal when to a PLC when
the door is opened, which disables a power contactor relay. A dangerous
failure in any element causes the safety function to fail.
5Proportion of failures due to common cause is not directly estimated by the
user in ISO 13849. A proportion of 2% was assumed by the standard committee,
which has to be assured if enough measures are taken. The user has implement
some of the measures, which are listed in Annex F of ISO 13849-1.
6Safety-related diagram block is a graphical representation introduced by ISO
13849. This representation resembles Reliability Diagram Blocks (RBD), but there
are not equivalent. Safety-related block diagrams are intended only for representa-
tion purposes, not for quantification.
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2.3.1.2 Category 1
This category is based in the category B, with the addition that
only components that are proven to be suitable to safety application,
either by use in the past or suitable verification. Programmable com-
ponents are not allowed for category 1. A safety-related block diagram
of designated architecture for category 1 is shown in figure 16.
2.3.1.3 Category 2
Additionally to the requirements of category B, category 2 re-
quires that the correct operation of the safety function must be moni-
tored. In the case of a failure that can be detected, the SRP/CS must
trigger a reaction, which can be either signalizing the fault or bring-
ing the machine to a safe condition. A safety-related block diagram of
designated architecture for category 2 is shown in figure 17.
Figure 17 – Graphical representation of designated architecture for cat-
egory 2. I stands for Input element, L for Logic, O for output element,
m for monitoring, TE for test equipment and OTE for Output of the
test equipment.
A typical example for a category 2 system is use of a watch-
dog module for verification of software execution. In case of an error,
watchdog module triggers an error signal.
2.3.1.4 Category 3
A category 3 function must fulfill the requirements of category
B and, as main characteristic, a single fault of any component does
not cause the failure of the safety function. It represents usage of
redundancy in the safety function, which must comply to measures to
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avoid common cause failures. Failures of components must be detected
to a reasonable effort. A safety-related block diagram of designated
architecture for category 3 is shown in figure 18.
Figure 18 – Graphical representation of designated architecture for cat-
egory 2. I1 and I2 stands for Input, L1 and L2 for Logic, O1 and O2
for output element, m for monitoring and c for cross-monitoring.
2.3.1.5 Category 4
For compliance with category 4, a function must provide tol-
erance at least against one component failure, and failures must be
detected before a next demand arises. If a failure is undetectable, then
an accumulation of failures shall not cause the failure of the function.
A safety-related block diagram of designated architecture for category
4 is shown in figure 19.
Figure 19 – Graphical representation of designated architecture for cat-
egory 2. I1 and I2 stands for Input, L1 and L2 for Logic, O1 and O2
for output element, m for monitoring and c for cross-monitoring. Dif-
ference from figure 18 are the solid lines between L and O, denoting
intensive monitoring.
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2.3.1.6 Custom architectures
ISO 13849 requires that architectures of safety functions be as-
signed to a category. This is a normative requirement7 for assignment
of PL. Designated architectures are used to graphically represent
the categories, and were used to calculate values of table K.1. However,
the standard states that custom architectures may be used as well, as
long as they are shown to be equivalent.
Categories specify desired behaviors of the safety function in the
case of a failure, not a specific architecture. So, if different implemen-
tation achieve the same behavior, they may be claimed as the same
category. For example:
• A safety function implemented with three-channels may be re-
garded as category 3 or 4, depending on other characteristics. If
some failures are detected, it can be regarded as category 3. If
detection of failures is improved, it may achieve category 48;
• A safety function with two channels, but no diagnostics, may be
regarded as category B or 1.
2.3.2 Mean Time to Dangerous Failure - MTTFd
For ISO 13849, reliability of components and safety functions are
quantified in terms of the Mean Time To dangerous Failure, MTTFd.
The MTTFd is the inverse of failure rate (see section 2.1.5),
considering only dangerous failure modes. To calculate it, it shall be
considered the ratio of dangerous failures (refer to section 2.2.2). For
some components, manufacturers state the MTTFd value, and what
are the dangerous failure modes considered. In other cases, it must be
specified from the Ratio of dangerous failures, calculated by a Failure
Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). If neither is possible, ISO 13849
state that 50% of all failures must be considered dangerous, as a con-
servative approach.
From the MTTFd of components, it is necessary to estimate an
MTTFd for the complete safety function. The process for estimation
of the safety function MTTFd is as follows:
7mandatory
8Further investigation on models for quantification of common cause failures
would still be necessary.
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1. Evaluate the MTTFd of each component;
2. Estimate the MTTFd of each channel using parts count method;
3. Calculate an equivalent MTTFd from both channels with equa-
tion 2.31 .
For evaluation of MTTFd of each component, different data
sources may be used. Preferred are data from manufacturers.
For estimation of the MTTFd of each channel, it is necessary that
the structure of the function is already known. Therefrom is possible
to know to whichever channel each component belongs, and combine
them for each channel through the equation:
1
MTTFd
=
N∑
i=1
1
MTTFdi
(2.30)
In the case of redundant structures (categories 3 and 4), there is
an MTTFd for each channel, which may be different from each other.
In this case, it is necessary to calculate an equivalent MTTFd, through
the equation:
MTTFd =
2
3
[
MTTFd,C1 +MTTFd,C2 − 11
MTTFd,C1
+ 1MTTFd,C2
]
(2.31)
Resulting MTTFd value can be then used in the table K.1 from
ISO 13849.
The standard limits MTTFd of each channel between 3 and 100
years. An MTTFd lower than 3 years is not allowed; higher than 100
years is considered as 100 years. Components are allowed to have higher
MTTFd.
MTTFd shall not be considered as a measure of lifetime; it must
be considered strictly as a failure rate valid within a time frame and
under specified conditions. An MTTFd of 3 years do not mean that
a component lasts for 3 years neither that it is the minimum mission
time; it means that the considered failure rate is:
λd =
1
MTTFd
= 13 years · 8670 hours/year = 3.81·10
−5failures/hour
(2.32)
Limitation in range of allowed MTTFd values can be interpreted as
limitation in the range of allowed failure rates. g In the sense of ISO
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Table 4 – DCavg classification
Denotation Range
None DCavg ≤ 60%
Low 60% < DCavg ≤ 90%
Medium 90% < DCavg ≤ 99%
High 99% < DCavg
13849, as an MTTFd for pneumatic, hydraulic and electromechanical
components is calculated from B10 values, a limit for utilization of
obtained MTTFd must be calculated. If this limit is inferior to mission
time TM , the component has to be changed after the limit has expired.
2.3.3 Average Diagnostic Coverage - DCavg
The diagnostic coverage is the proportion of the failures of a com-
ponent which can be detect through testing and monitoring. This value
is dependent of the system configuration and measures adopted by the
machine designer. Strictly speaking, diagnostic coverage is calculated
by:
DC =
∑
λd,D∑
λd
(2.33)
Where λd,D is the failure rate of the dangerous failure modes which are
detected and λd is the failure rate of all dangerous failure modes.
As normally the designer does not have detailed information re-
garding failure rates and failure modes, ISO 13849 list some common
failure detection measures for different components and technologies,
with typical DC values, in Annex E. In that way, DC of each component
can be estimated by the measures implemented in the machine.
The average diagnostic coverage DCavg is a weighted average of
the DC of all components. The weighting factor is the MTTFd of each
component. It is estimated by:
DCavg =
DC1
MTTFd1
+ DC2MTTFd2 + · · ·+ DCNMTTFdN
1
MTTFd1
+ 1MTTFd2 + · · ·+ 1MTTFdN
(2.34)
In order to have a table with reduced size, DCavg s classified into
four levels, as represented in table 4.
The resulting categorized DCavg value can be then used in the
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table K.1 from ISO 13849.
With category, MTTFd and DCavg, PFH can be estimated by
table K.1 from ISO 13849. Figure 20 is a summary of the table, and
provides an overview of which PL is possible to reach with each cate-
gory.
Figure 20 – Summary of table K.1 of ISO 13849. Reproduced from
Bosch Rexroth (ORTH et al., 2012)
The ISO 13849 standard gives guidance only for PFH estimation
with table K.1 and the bar chart (see figure 20). There is no guidance
on how to build models, nor how to evaluate it. In the next chapter,
methods for PFH estimation are developed and verified against table
K.1
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3 ALTERNATIVE METHODS FOR PFH
CALCULATION
The ISO 13849 standard can be seen as a method for the av-
erage frequency of dangerous failure per hour, PFH estimation, given
category, MTTFd and DCavg. This method consists of a table for some
common cases in the machinery sector. This is represented in figure 21,
a). This method is however a black box. There is no documentation
of how these values presented in the table K.1 from ISO 13849 were
calculated in details. There is only the STSARCES Report (DORRA;
REINERT, 2000), which was an investigative report that gave the basis
for ISO 13849.
Figure 21 – Differences between current method by a) ISO 13849 and
b) proposed method. In b), instead of specifying MTTFd for the safety
function, it is necessary to specify the parameters of Weibull distribu-
tion, η and βW . It is also necessary to specify mission time TM .
The objective of this chapter is to present a method for calcula-
tion of redundant architectures with components whose failures follow
the Weibull distribution, as represented in figure 21, b).
3.1 HOW WAS CONSTRUCTED TABLE K.1 OF ISO 13849?
Models for PFH calculation can include more or less details
(GOBLE, 2010), depending of what is intended with the analysis. For
each category of ISO 13849, a Markov model was generated to repre-
sent its correspondent designated architecture (see sections 2.3.1.1 to
2.3.1.5), including failure rates of each block individually, frequency of
automatic tests performed by the system to detect failures, diagnostic
coverage, time to repair of the safety system, rate of demands of safety
function, proportion of failures due to common causes, among others.
It is not know how detailed and which parameters were considered as
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the results were grouped into ranges of MTTFd and DCavg.
STSARCES Report (DORRA; REINERT, 2000) was an investiga-
tion report that applied Markov process to model categories of EN
9541. Models were constructed considering the whole safety function
at once, i.e. all functional blocks (Input, Logic, Output). This ap-
proach generates big and complex models, once number of states in a
Markov model increases exponentially with the number of blocks, but
it was preferred in order to evaluate the influence of each individual
parameter in the model. Table K.1 of ISO 13849 was generated from
such models, taking mean values of exhaustive test calculations.
Studies of the German Institute for Insurance against Work Ac-
cidents (HAUKE et al., 2009, pp. 348) state that the absolute value of
demand and test rate have a negligible effect on the PFH. Main influ-
ence is exerted by the overall failure rate, represented by MTTFd, by
diagnostic coverage DCavg and by the structure.
Other parameters beyond those explicit in table K.1 a were mod-
eled. As influence of their variation is small, they were considered in-
ternally in the calculation models, but not made explicit. They are:
• Demand rate
• Frequency of tests
• Repair rate or Repair time
• Proportion of Common Cause Failures
• Mission time2
Even that the exact model that generate the table K.1 is not
known, it is useful to know the modeling process and hypotheses used,
in order to be able to transfer to another modeling technique. It has to
be then evaluated which of the hypothesis and details can be modeled
or ignored in the new techniques.
3.2 PFH CALCULATION BY DISCRETE EVENT SIMULATION
For this problem, safety functions are modeled in Reliability
Block Diagrams, RBD for short, and PFH is evaluated by discrete event
1EN 954 is the predecessor standard for safety of machine controls. See section
1.4.1 and Lereverend(LERe´Ve´REND, 2008).
2Considered as a limit for the utilization of the component
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simulation. This technique is preferred because the reliability represen-
tation is close to schematic drawings and physical components, facil-
itating comprehension of technicians and engineers that do not have
knowledge in reliability modeling. Use of simulation allows calculation
of PFH considering any failure distribution, inclusive Weibull distribu-
tion.
Basis of calculation is explained by mean of an example. In figure
23, PFH is obtained by simulation. A reliability block diagram (RBD)
is modeled as in figure 22. In this model, block A represents failures
in channel 1 that are detected, block B represents failures in channel 1
that are undetected, block C represents failures in channel 2 that are
detected, block D represents failures in channel 2 that are undetected
and block E represents failures due to common causes (CCF).
A B
C D
E
Figure 22 – 1oo2 RDB for category 3 or 4. Block A represents detected
failures in channel 1; block B, undetected failures in channel 1; block C,
detected failures in channel 2; block D, undetected failures in channel
2 and block E, failures due to common causes (CCF).
Figure 23 represents dynamics of reliability simulation, i.e.
events during simulation time. All component failures considered in
this example are dangerous. It is important to notice that not ev-
ery dangerous component failure leads to a dangerous control system
failure. Effects of failures on the safety system are discussed as follows.
Figure 23 – Simulation for determination of PFH. Time axis is not
intended to be in scale and do not represent typical values.
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1. At time t1, a component in channel 1 fails, but it is detected by
the control system. Machine goes to a safe state. Operation is
stopped, but there is no hazardous situation due to the control
system;
2. At time t2, the failed component is repaired. The machine returns
to operation;
3. At time t3, a component in channel 2 fails and it is not detected
by the control system. Machine continues to operate, and it is
still safe because safety function is still provided by channel 1;
4. At time t4, a component in channel 1 fails and it is not detected
by the control system. Machine continues to operate, but in a
hazardous condition, as the safety function is not provided any-
more;
5. At time t5, a demand on the safety function reveals that it is not
being provided. Machine has to be stopped and components have
to be repaired. After repair, machine continues to operate;
6. At time t6, a component in channel 1 fails and it is not detected
by the control system. Machine continues to operate, and safety
function is still provided by channel 2;
7. At time t7, a component in channel 2 fails, but it is detected by
the control system. Machine goes to a safe state;
8. At time t8, components of both channels are repaired and machine
returns to operation. Safety function is restored;
9. At time t9, components of both channels fail due to a common
cause, represented by block E of figure figure 22. Machine con-
tinues to operate, but in a hazardous condition, as the safety
function is not provided anymore;
10. At time t10 a demand of the safety function reveals that it is not
being provided. Components are repaired and machine returns
to operation;
11. At time t11, a component in channel 2 fails and is not detected
by the control system. Machine continues to operate and safety
function is still provided by channel 1;
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12. At time t12, a component in channel 1 fails and is not detected
by the control system. Machine continues to operate, but in a
hazardous condition, as the safety function is not provided any-
more;
13. At time t13 a demand of the safety function reveals that it is not
being provided. Components are repaired and machine returns
to operation;
Simulation runs until simulation time reaches mission time TM .
In the end of simulation failures that cause the machine to enter in
a hazardous state are counted as the Number of failures at time TM ,
N(TM ). Each transition to a hazardous state counts as one dangerous
control system failure; that is, N(t) is increased by 1. In the example of
figure 23 the events at time t4, t9 and t12 are considered as dangerous
and N(TM ) equals 3.
Simulation has to be repeated for N times, where different event
sequences occur. At the end of all simulations, N(TM ) is averaged
through the number of simulations N, resulting in an estimate of the
expected number of failures,Eˆ(N(TM )). PFH is calculated by dividing
Eˆ(N(TM )) by TM , as in equation 2.29.
3.3 TOOLS
BlockSim is a software from Reliasoft that allows construction
of RBD and evaluation of reliability measures for these diagrams. It is
used as an evaluation tool. It offers support for non-repairable and re-
pairable systems, and also provide simulation capabilities. A structure
is simulated through discrete event simulation, where random times to
failure for each block are generated following its failure distribution. Af-
ter each failure, the overall behavior of the system (working or failure)
is analyzed based on the state of each component and the structure.
BlockSim allows modeling of time to failure distributions, time to
repair distributions for each block, different distributions, events that
trigger repair and maintenance actions. It does not have resources for
modeling events as tests, demands nor for duration of events, as tests
duration, demands duration and time to failure detection. Therefore,
some simplification hypothesis are used:
1. A failure due to common cause leads to the failure of the safety
function, and cannot be detected;
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2. Only dangerous failures are considered. Failures and repairs that
do not impair the safety function are not accounted;
3. Failure modes are separated in detectable and undetectable. A
detectable failure mode will always be detected. An undetectable
will never be detected, independent of how many tests are per-
formed;
4. Automatic tests are instantaneous;
5. A detected failure always leads the system instantaneously to safe
state;
6. Repair begins instantaneously once in safe state;
7. An undetected failure does not lead to the failure of the safety
function, in the case of redundant structures;
8. Two undetected failures are detected by a demand of the safety
function, in the case of redundant structures;
9. Demand is continuous;
3.4 METHOD FOR CALCULATION OF PFH WITH RELIABILITY
BLOCK DIAGRAMS AND SIMULATION
A calculation method is presented in this section. It is a sequence
of steps for setting up simulation. Detailed explanation of each method
step is given in the sequence.
Method: Method for PFH calculation with BlockSim
Data: Parameters of failure distribution of each
component, DC of each component, mission time TM
Result: PFH
1 Model the RBD;
2 Determine intrinsic parameters;
3 Determine failure parameters of each block (see sub-steps);
4 Determine number of simulations;
5 Set simulation end time to mission time;
6 Convert simulation results into PFH;
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A
Figure 24 – Model for category B and category 1
3.4.1 Model the RBD
In principle, ISO 13849 allows application of any architecture,
since they fulfill the requirements of the categories. The categories
have the designated architectures, which are a guidance to design, but
they are not mandatory. Any architecture which has the same failure
behavior is allowed.
Nevertheless, in order to enable a better understanding, two fixed
RBD are suggested for the calculation here presented. One RBD mod-
els categories B and 1, and the second suggested RBD models for cat-
egories 3 and 4. These RBD are used for PFH calculation both with
exponential or Weibull distributed failures.
For categories B and 1, figure 24 shows how it is represented.
This model is very simple, comprising only one block, which may
represent a single component or a whole channel. It is suitable for these
categories because there is no redundancy, nor detection of failures.
Once the channel fails, a demand of the safety function reveals the
failure, and it must be repaired. The time to repair must be specified
as well.
For categories 3 and 4, a 1oo23 RBD is used to represent a struc-
ture with single fault tolerance, detection of failures and failures due to
common cause. This is represented in figure 22. Failure of each block
is now described by a Weibull distribution.
The block diagram contains two channels to represent redun-
dancy (fault tolerance), where each channel is composed by two failure
modes, detected and undetected, and a series block to represent com-
mon cause failures of both channels, as represented in figure 22. This
model is equivalent to the block diagram representation of a 1oo2 archi-
tecture, from IEC 61508-6 (International Electrotechnical Comission, 2010b).
Association to failure and repair parameters is discussed in the
next sections.
31oo2 stands for 1 out of 2, which means that out of 2 channels, one must not
fail in order to fulfill the function.
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3.4.2 Determine intrinsic parameters
As discussed in section 3.1, there are other parameters than cate-
gory, MTTFd and DCavg that were used to generate the models used to
calculate PFH in ISO 13849. As their order of magnitude is much lower
than MTTFd, their absolute value does not influence strongly in PFH
calculation. However, PFH is a measure of repairable systems, and no
consideration of repair (and repair rate) and test (and test frequency)
leads to wrong results.
As there is no study in the scope of the ISO 13849 and no ref-
erence of what is acceptable for compliance with the standard, the
same values used in ISO 13849 are used here. These values, while are
not given by the standard, are mentioned by the STSARCES Report
(DORRA; REINERT, 2000) and by the BGIA Report 2/2008e (HAUKE et
al., 2009).
As safety-related controls are integrated to machinery, once a
failure occurs, they must be repaired in order to the machine be able
to be operated again. Therefore, a safety function must be modeled as
a repairable system. In a repairable model, it is necessary to specify the
repair time as well. Repair times are assumed to be random, following
a exponential distribution, with mean time of 8 hours.
Common cause failures are assumed to be represented by the
Beta-factor model (refer to section 2.1.16). For the machinery sector,
it is estimated that a factor of 2% is realistic, which is assumed in
the case of compliance with the process described in Annex F of ISO
13849. It is not allowed to design a redundant safety function that do
not comply to this process.
Mission time, TM , is assumed to be 20 years. For the case of
Weibull distribution, other values of mission time are considered, in
order to evaluate possible effects.
As discussed in section 3.3, BlockSim version 6.5 does not have
resources for modeling periodic demands or tests. The effect of a failure
of a block is evaluated at the time point it occurs, meaning that a
detected failure mode is instantaneously detected, what corresponds to
continuous testing, with no duration. A failure of the overall safety
function is detected instantaneously, what corresponds to the case of
continuous demand.
A summary of intrinsic parameters in given in table 5.
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Table 5 – Summary of intrinsic parameters
Parameter Value
Demand rate Higher than 1 demand per year
Repair rate µ 1 repair each 8 hour
Test frequency -
Common cause failure factor βCCF 2%
Mission time TM 20 years
3.4.3 Determine failure parameters of each block
Failure parameters are dependent of category, the number of
blocks in each model and the failure distribution that is assigned for
each block. Therefore, failure parameters have to be determined indi-
vidually for each case.
In the next sections, failure parameters are determined regarding
to each category and failure distribution. Sub-steps for step 3 are listed.
3.4.4 Determine number of simulations
A simulation run is a realization of random failure and repair
times. The safety function (modeled by the RBD) keeps failing and
being repaired, until the selected time for the end of the simulation.
Simulation end time is equivalent to the mission time of the control
system. Repeating this process many times generates data enough to
derive statistics of the safety function.
From the simulation, the expected number of failures is esti-
mated. This estimate is used as the expected number of failures in
equation 2.29.
E(N(TM )) = Eˆ(N(TM )) (3.1)
Number of simulations has to be set according to the desired
precision. This is accomplished by the equation:
Nsim =
1
PFH · TM (3.2)
Where Nsim is the number of simulations, PFH is the desired precision
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for PFH result and TM is the mission time.
3.4.5 Convert simulation results into PFH
The output of interest in the simulation is the expected number
of failures. From this result, it is possible to calculate PFH via equation
2.29. As mission time for the safety function is considered 20 years in
the scope of the ISO 13849, the expected number of failures must be
divided by this value in hours, which is 175200 hours.
Besides expected number of failures, BlockSim gives standard
deviation for the calculated expected number of failures. From IEC
61508-6, a 90% confidence interval for estimated mean is given by:
ConfE(N(t)) = 1.64 ·
σE(N(t))√
N
(3.3)
Where ConfE(N(t)) means the confidence interval, σE(N(t)) is the stan-
dard deviation of the expected number of failures, calculated by Block-
Sim, and N is the number of simulations.
Equation 3.3 can be adapted to an equation for the 90% confi-
dence interval for PFH, as given:
ConfPFH = 1.64 ·
σE(N(t))
175200√
N
(3.4)
3.5 COMPARISON BETWEEN ISO 13849 AND PROPOSED
METHOD
In order to confirm that the proposed method deliver correct
results, i.e. the same results from ISO 13849 for the same inputs, PFH
is calculated for categories B, 1, 3 and 4, for the whole range of MTTFd
and DCavg values.
3.5.1 Catergory B or 1
PFH is calculated for category B, for the range of MTTFd values
from 3 to 27 years, and for category 1, MTTFd ranging from 30 to 100
years. These are the same values presented in table K.1 from ISO 13849.
Diagram block from figure 24 is used, meaning that only λd = 1/MTTFd
77
has to be specified.
A PFH result is considered valid if it fall under the same PL as
its respective reference PFH value from the standard. For a discussion
about validation of results, see appendix E.
Calculation results are displayed in figure 26. This figure is also
displayed in tabular form, in table 12, in appendix E.
As it can be seen in figure 26, all the cases for category B and
1 result in the same PL for the calculated and reference PFH. This
method is therefore considered satisfactory.
3.5.2 Catergory 3 or 4
For this method, the RBD from figure 22 is used. In this RBD,
there are 5 blocks whose failure parameters have to be defined.
As input parameters, category, overall MTTFd and DCavg are
used. Category is already considered in the RBD. From the MTTFd
and the DCavg the five failure distribution parameters are derived. For
all 5 blocks, an exponential failure rate is assumed. Therefore, an
MTTFd for each block is needed.
Although the standard is written in terms of MTTFd, usage of
failure rate provides simpler algebraic manipulation. Therefore, for the
exponential failure distribution, the relation
λd =
1
MTTFd
(3.5)
is used allow usage of failure rates.
Figure 25 represents this approach of failure parameters deriva-
tion.
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Figure 25 – Representation of the determination of the failure rates for
each block
Failure rate λd represents the overall failure rate, for both chan-
nels. The proportion of failures due to common cause is given by βCCF ,
and is deducted from the overall failure rate. This results in
λCCF = λd · βCCF (3.6)
and
λindependent = λd · (1− βCCF ) (3.7)
Failure rate λCCF from equation 3.6 is the failure rate of block E from
figure 22.
From the independent proportion of failure rate, it is considered
that both channels have the same failure rate, and that it is equal to
the independent failure rate. This assumption is not correct, because
components in parallel with exponential distribution do not result in
a system with exponential distribution, making equation 3.5 invalid,
and because an equivalent MTTF would be higher than MTTF of both
channels, given by
MTTFsystem = MTTFCh1 +MTTFCh2 − 11
MTTFCh1
+ 1MTTFCh2
(3.8)
according to (BILLINTON; ALLAN, 1992). It can be shown that, when
MTTFCh1 = MTTFCh2, MTTFsystem is 1.5 times higher than both
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MTTF.
However, ISO 13849 has an conservative approach, and it in-
troduces an factor of 2/3 in the MTTFd symmetrization equation, as
reproduced again:
MTTFd =
2
3
[
MTTFd,C1 +MTTFd,C2 − 11
MTTFd,C1
+ 1MTTFd,C2
]
(3.9)
It can be shown in equation 3.9 that if MTTFCh1 = MTTFCh2,
then MTTFd,Ch1 = MTTFd,Ch2 = MTTFd. Because of this conclusion,
failure rates of each channel are assumed to be equal to the overall
independent failure rate.
As all of the dangerous failure modes can be divided into detected
and undetected, the following equation applies
λd = λd,D + λd,U (3.10)
Substituting equation 3.10 in 2.33 leads to
λd,D = λd ·DCavg (3.11)
and
λd,U = λd · (1−DCavg) (3.12)
Manipulating equations 3.7, 3.11 and 3.12 leads to
λdD = λd ·DCavg · (1− βCCF ) (3.13)
for the blocks A and C of figure 22, and
λdU = λd · (1−DCavg) · (1− βCCF ) (3.14)
for the blocks B and D.
Resulting sub-steps for step 3 of proposed method (section 3.4
are:
Sub-method: Sub steps for step 3 of calculation method
3.1 Calculate λd = 1MTTFd ;
3.2 Calculate λCCF = λd · βCCF ;
3.3 Calculate λdD = λd ·DCavg · (1− βCCF );
3.4 Calculate λdU = λd · (1−DCavg) · (1− βCCF );
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Results for category 3 with DCavg of 60% and 90%, and for
category 4 were calculated, and are displayed in figure 26. The same
results are presented in a table in appendix E.
For category 3 with DCavg of 60% deviation was high enough,
specially for low MTTFd values, to generate cases with different PL.
This happens with the cases where the reference PFH was close to the
transition value of one PL to another, namely MTTFd of 11 and 24
years. As the calculated PL is lower than the reference, the calculated
value is conservative and therefore, acceptable.
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Figure 26 – Comparison of PFH values of ISO 13849 and calculated through BlockSim for all calculated categories.
Intervals that represent different Performance Levels are shaded in different colors.
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3.6 USE OF WEIBULL DISTRIBUTION
Impact of Weibull distribution is just on failure parameters of
each block (Figs. 22 and 24). Therefore, just step 3 has to be adapted.
Failure parameters are dependent of the system and analysis has to be
performed for each case.
Although there is no reference to compare whether calculated
values are correct for category B and 1, it provides insight of influence
of Weibull distribution in PFH. For an application example of categories
3 and 4, refer to chapter 4.
3.6.1 Catergory B or 1 with Weibull distribution
Instead of entering failure rate or MTTFd for the block, param-
eters η and βW of the Weibull distribution have to be specified. These
parameters can be specified by a failure field analysis (Weibull analy-
sis), as proposed by Orth and Raksch (ORTH; RAKSCH, 2014).
Parameters of the Weibull distribution must be known for this
method. Although accuracy of results is strongly dependent of accuracy
of input data, origin of η and βW parameter do not have influence on
the method here presented.
Sub-method: Sub steps for step 3 of calculation method
considering category B or 1 with Weibull distribution
3.1 Assign η and βW to the block;
In the present method, the mission time becomes an explicit pa-
rameter. Assumption of Weibull distribution models wear-out effects,
removing the limitation of the useful life. As the failure rate changes
with time, PFH varies as well, and it becomes important to specify to
which mission time the safety function is designed.
For this method, only theoretical values were considered, in or-
der to evaluate the effect of Weibull distribution. Four cases were sim-
ulated, for different mission times. They are represented in table 6.
The characteristic lifetime η is based in the typical MTTFd for
hydraulic valves suggested by ISO 13849, which is 150 years. This value
is however capped to 100 years, as this is the maximal allowed for each
channel of a safety function, in the current version of the standard.
To find an equivalent Weibull distribution to MTTFd of 100
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Table 6 – Assignment of Performance Level according to PFH
Characteristic lifetime η 100 years
Shape parameter βW 1; 1,3; 1,5 and 2
Mission time (Simulation stop time) From 1 to 30 years
Number of simulations 50000
years, the point of 63% of failures was chosen. In the exponential
distribution, this point is represented by the MTTFd, considering only
dangerous failures. That means, in 100 years, there would be 63% of
failed items. The point of 63% of failures in the Weibull distribution
is given by η. This can be demonstrated substituting η as time in
equation 2.16 of the cumulative probability distribution, resulting in
F (η) = 1− e−( ηη )
β
= 1− e−(1)β = 1− e−1 = 0, 6321... (3.15)
Therefore, η was chosen as 100 years.
Values for the shape parameter were chosen based in common
values for hydraulic valves, provided by preliminary studies from Bosch
Rexroth, as presented by Orth and Raksch (ORTH; RAKSCH, 2014).
Resulting failure rates are represented in figure 27. PFH results
are given in figure 29.
Resulting PFH values for each of the four cases are displayed in
figure 29. For each different mission time, it is calculated the average
PFH from 0 to the mission time (e.g. for 5 years, the average from 0
to 5 years; for 10 years, the average from 0 to 10 years of operation).
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Figure 27 – Failure rate of the four analyzed cases
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Figure 28 – Failure distribution of the four analyzed cases
85
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 3010
−8
10−7
10−6
10−5
Mission time [years]
P
F
H
[
1
/
h
]
Exponential
Weibull beta = 1.3
Weibull beta = 1.5
Weibull beta = 2
Figure 29 – PFH calculated for different mission times
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It can be seen that for lower mission times and higher shape
parameters (βW ), the PFH increases. This effect is due to low failure
rates in the beginning of life of components. As time increases, failure
rates of components increases, as represented by figure 27, and PFH
increases as well.
3.6.2 Catergory 3 or 4 with Weibull distribution
This method is intended to calculate PFH for a redundant ar-
chitecture with Weibull distribution. It is suitable for safety functions
implemented with redundant component, as a control block with 2 hy-
draulic valves.
Additional hypotheses are considered in order to obtain failure
parameters for each block. They are:
1. Detected and undetected failure modes have the same distribution
type as the respective component;
2. The distribution of a component can be written as a combination
of the distribution of its failure modes;
3. Shape parameter βW of failure modes are the same as the shape
parameter βW of a component;
Each block is described by two parameters, η and βW . As there
are 5 blocks in the RBD, there are 10 block parameters. In order
to avoid confusion, each parameter is referred with a subscript of its
respective block. Considering it, the problem becomes determination
of ηA, βW,A, ηB , βW,B , ηC , βW,C , ηD, βW,D, ηE and βW,E .
These parameters are given by the equations 3.16 to 3.25. For
these equations, it is assumed that channels are not symmetric, i.e. each
component has a different distribution, and that diagnostic coverage is
different also for each component. Therefore, DC must be specified for
each component.
Reason for choosing to keep equations based on failure and de-
tection parameters for each component is that these parameters are
indeed calculated during design. Deduction of equations from 3.16 to
3.25 can be found in appendix D.
A specific method for PFH calculation with Weibull distribution
is given.
ηA = ηdD,Ch1 =
ηCh1
βW,Ch1
√
DCCh1(1− βCCF )
(3.16)
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Sub-method: Sub steps for step 3 of calculation method
considering category 3 or 4 with Weibull distribution
3.1 Calculate ηA and βW,A (Eqs. 3.16 and 3.17);
3.2 Calculate ηB and βW,B (Eqs. 3.18 and 3.19);
3.3 Calculate ηC and βW,C (Eqs. 3.20 and 3.21);
3.4 Calculate ηD and βW,D (Eqs. 3.22 and 3.23);
3.5 Calculate ηE and βW,E (Eqs. 3.24 and 3.25);
βA = βW,dD,Ch1 = βW,Ch1 (3.17)
ηB = ηdU,Ch1 =
ηCh1
βW,Ch1
√
(1−DCCh1)(1− βCCF )
(3.18)
βB = βW,dU,Ch1 = βW,Ch1 (3.19)
ηC = ηdD,Ch2 =
ηCh2
βW,Ch2
√
DCCh2(1− βCCF )
(3.20)
βC = βW,dD,Ch2 = βW,Ch2 (3.21)
ηD = ηdU,Ch2 =
ηCh2
βW,Ch2
√
(1−DCCh2)(1− βCCF )
(3.22)
βD = βW,dU,Ch2 = βW,Ch2 (3.23)
ηE = ηCCF =
ηAUX
βW,AUX
√
βCCF
(3.24)
βE = βW,CCF = βW,AUX (3.25)
s To the present date, there is no known work on the consideration of
Weibull distributed failures for PFH calculation of a redundant archi-
tecture for safety functions, neither under the scope of ISO 13849 nor
IEC 61508. Additionally to this, it is impracticable to demonstrate the
results through experiments. Due to these two factors, the presented
method remains without verification.
In the next chapter, the presented method is applied to calculate
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PFH for a hydraulic machine. Results are compared with the method
provided by the ISO 13849 standard.
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4 CASE STUDY OF A HYDRAULIC CONTROL
SYSTEM
In this section, it is investigated the PFH of a hydraulic control
system. At a first moment, the control system is analyzed by method
of ISO 13849. After that, analysis is made with the method of section
3.6.2, when Weibull distribution is used for modeling components’ fail-
ures. Only the quantitative aspects are considered in this work. The
qualitative aspects are as important as the quantitative, but they are
out of the scope.
This chapter is organized in the following manner: First, a de-
scription of the system. Second, a description of the proposed safety
function. In the sequence, PFH is calculated following the ISO 13849
method. After, PFH is calculated following the proposed method. At
the end, results are compared and analyzed.
As in figure 21, mission time TM is made an explicit parameter.
4.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The system to be studied is a test stand from the Laboratory of
Hydraulic and Pneumatic Systems(Laborato´rio de Sistemas Hidra´ulicos
e Pneuma´ticos - LASHIP) from the Federal University of Santa Cata-
rina (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina - UFSC). It is an existing
installation, that can be seen in figure 30. It is described by Gonzalez
(GONZALEZ, 2012).
A new hypothetical application as a test stand would require it
to follow the EHSR from Machinery Directive or NR12, what includes
designing the control system according to ISO 13849.
Purpose of this new test stand is to perform endurance tests of
mechanical components with controlled force and torque. The compo-
nent to be tested is cyclically loaded by a hydraulic cylinder. Duration
of each cycle is 30 seconds. The test stand is intended to operate con-
tinuously until the test termination criteria is met, or a stop by safety
reasons is necessary. The hydraulic circuit responsible for driving the
cylinders is shown in figure 31.
In order to reduce risks of harms due to moving parts, a stop
must be triggered when someone is in the surroundings of the machine.
This reaction configures a safety function. Not only one safety function
is required in order to reduce risks associated to the hydraulic test
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Figure 30 – Picture of the LASHIP test stand
stand. However, only the function Safety-related stop initiated by
a safeguard is analyzed in this work.
Previous studies concluded that this application requires PL d
(refer to table 2 and figure 5). In the next section, the safety function
is designed to meet the integrity, i.e. quantitative requirements of the
ISO 13849. That is, only PFH to meet the required PL is calculated;
there is no concern in this work to software and systematic failures, nor
to the effectiveness of the function (response time, etc.).
4.2 DESIGN OF SAFETY FUNCTION
A safety-related stop is required when a person is in the sur-
roundings of the test stand. A pressure mat and a safety relay are used
to detect presence of persons in the hazardous area and trigger a stop
signal to the hydraulic circuit.
The function is implemented by modules that already implement
a partial safety function. The overview of the safety function can be
seen in figure 32. The sensor sub-function is implemented by a safety
mat, that detects presence in the surroundings. The logic sub-function
is implemented by a safety relay, which monitors both channels of the
safety mat, and implement other safety functions, like manual reset, but
that are not important for this analysis. For both sensor and logic sub-
functions, components are already constructed to meet requirements of
category 3 and 4 and PL d and e.
In order to achieve PL d for the safety function, it is necessary to
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Figure 31 – Schematics of the original hydraulic circuit. Reproduced
from Gonzalez (GONZALEZ, 2012)
Figure 32 – Architecture of the proposed safety function
achieve PL d for the hydraulic circuit as well. For that, it is necessary
to design the actuator subsystem with category 2 or 3, as presented in
the bar chart of figure 20. Category 3 is preferred, which implies in
realization of the safety function with tolerance against single failure,
that is, redundancy in the realization of the safety function.
In the case of a safety-related stop, redundancy means stopping
both cylinders by two different (and independent means). As the cylin-
ders are coupled, it is necessary block hydraulic fluid flow to one of
them.
A stop can be accomplished by valve 1V1. Due to constructive
measures1, the valve is suitable for a safety reaction (stop reaction). As
valves 1V2 and 1V3 are pressure reducing valves, they are not capable
of block hydraulic fluid flow, and cannot stop the system’s movement.
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Therefore, an additional mean to stop the cylinders is needed.
In order to provide a second function channel, an additional valve
is proposed. The resulting circuit is shown in figure 33. Diagnostics
of the circuit is provided by spool-position of valve 1V1, encoder 1S1,
pressure sensors 1S2 and 1S3, and solved by the controlling computer.
A proposal for the hydraulic circuit is shown in figure 33. The
resulting RBD of the actuator subsystem is shown in figure 34.
Figure 33 – Schematics of the proposed hydraulic circuit
1V1
0V1
Figure 34 – Redundancy by two hydraulic valves performing a safety-
related stop
1This valve has sufficient overlapping and is spring-centered, blocking flow in the
centered position when power is removed from its solenoids.
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4.3 PFH CALCULATION ACCORDING TO ISO 13849
In order to estimate PFH according to ISO 13849, it is necessary
to estimate 3 parameters: category, DCavg and MTTFd. The first two
are already determined. Therefore, it is necessary to estimate overall
MTTFd of the hydraulic circuit.
4.3.1 MTTFd
MTTFd of hydraulic valve should be determined by the com-
ponent manufacturer. It should be determined via lifetime testing.
However, the standard states that given that hydraulic valves are man-
ufactured according to safety principles and with appropriate materi-
als and quality control processes, a value of 150 years can be claimed.
MTTFd: each valve fulfill the safety principles, and therefore each can
claim 150 years for MTTFd. However, the maximal MTTFd for each
channel is 100 years.
As each channel consists of one unique valve each,
Using equation 2.31, 100 years for MTTFd for both channels is
obtained.
4.3.2 DCavg
In the scope of ISO 13849, Diagnostic Coverage is estimated for
each item according to failure detection measures implemented. These
measures are listed in annex E of the standard. Valve 1V1 has an
integrated sensor for the position of the internal spool. Monitoring of
control valves is regarded as achieving 99% of detected failures.
Valve 0V1 has no spool position sensor. Failures of the valve are
indirectly detected by other means, as listed:
• Daily test of 0V1: Before automatic operation, 1V1 is left open
and a movement sequence is given to the control valve. Power is
removed from 0V1. If the cylinders stop, what can be monitored
by encoder 1S1, the valve is working properly. If the cylinders
continue to move, the valve has failed to danger and must be
changed.
• Demand of the safety function: When both 1V1 and 0V1 close,
flow and cylinders stop and pressures in 1S2 and 1S3 are kept
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constant. In the case of malfunction, pressures in both sensors
continue to vary according to the setpoints in the application
software.
Monitoring of failure in valve 0V1 corresponds to indirect measures, and
achieve 60% of detected failures, according to annex E of ISO 13849.
With DC of each component, DCavg is determined by equation
2.34
DCavg =
0.99
100 +
0.60
100
1
100 +
1
100
= 79.5% (4.1)
According to the classification (see table 4), the calculated value
corresponds to low DCavg.
4.3.3 Common cause failures
In order to guarantee the common cause factor βCCF of 2%, it
is necessary to use the process of Annex F of ISO 13849.
4.3.4 PFH estimation
From table K.1, with category 3, DCavg low and MTTFd of 100
years, the value of 1.01 · 10−7[1/h]. This PFH value assumes mission
time TM of 20 years. It is reproduced in appendix E of this work, table
13.
4.4 PFH CALCULATION ACCORDING TO PROPOSED METHOD
A preliminary study from Bosch Rexroth was conducted consid-
ering analysis of field failure records for the corresponding valves. Fail-
ure parameters were estimated by Weibull analysis, considering dan-
gerous failure modes only. Diagnostic coverage was estimated based on
the proportion of failures modes that are detectable. Due to confiden-
tiality, real values cannot be used. Nevertheless, values shown in table
7 are considered to be realistic for the application.
Three cases are considered: Case 1 refers to two valves, which
are regarded to be slightly less prone to failures as valves from Case 2.
Case 3 refers to the of not having position monitoring on shut off valve.
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Table 7 – Summary of failure distribution parameters as input for case
studies of a hydraulic actuator subsystem
Directional valve 1V1 Shut off valve 0V1 CCF
Case ηCh1 βW,Ch1 DCCh1 ηCh2 βW,Ch2 DCCh2 βCCF
1 30 y 2 90 % 45 y 2.8 99 % 2 %
2 24 y 2 90 % 40 y 2.4 90 % 2 %
3 24 y 2 90 % 40 y 2.4 60 % 2 %
Table 8 – Simulation parameters
Parameter Value
Mean repair time (MRT) 8 hours
Demand rate Continuous
Test rate Continuous
4.4.1 Model the RBD
In this case, the RBD proposed in figure 22 is used. It can be
seen modeled in BlockSim version 9 in figure 35.
Figure 35 – 5-block RBD for a redundant actuator subsystem for safety
4.4.2 Determine intrinsic parameters
The intrinsic parameters are kept as in ISO 13849. They are
summarized in table 9.
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Table 9 – Parameters for the block diagram
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
ηA 31.9438 y 24.3658 y 24.3658 y
βA 2 2 2
ηB 95.8315 y 242.437 y 242.437 y
βB 2 2 2
ηC 45.4888 y 42.1484 y 49.9060 y
βC 2.8 2.4 2.4
ηD 234.764 y 105.289 y 59.0914 y
βD 2.8 2.4 2.4
ηE 141.123 y 144.875 y 144.875 y
βE 3.62 3.17 3.17
4.4.3 Determine failure parameters of each block
Failure parameters for each block are calculated with values given
in table 7, with equations from 3.16 to 3.25. Results in table 9.
4.4.4 Determine number of simulations
It is expected to achieve PFH results up to PL e limit, which
is 10−8[1/h] in 20 years2. The desired increment PFH is 10−10[1/h].
From equation 3.2
Nsim =
1
10−10 · 175200 ≈ 57078 (4.2)
Simulation number was chosen 60000, which leads to PFH of 1.14 ·
10−10[1/h], considered acceptable.
4.4.5 Set simulation end time to mission time
Different mission times were used, in order to evaluate effects in
PFH. PFH is calculated as an average for each lifetime span, ranging
from 1 to 20 years of operation. Mission times are set as the time to
stop the simulation.
2175200 hours
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Table 10 – Calculated PFH with 90% confidence interval for actuator
subsystem considering mission time of 20 years
Calculated
PFH
90% con-
fidence
interval
Lower
PFH
Upper
PFH
PL
Case 1 1.85E-8 2.4E-9 1.61E-8 2.09E-8 e
Case 2 3.80E-8 3.4E-9 3.46E-8 4.14E-8 e
Case 3 9.84E-8 5.4E-9 9.30E-8 1.039E-7 d
4.4.6 Convert simulation results into PFH
BlockSim calculates Eˆ(N(t)) and σE(N(t)). Therefrom is possible
to estimate PFH and the 90% confidence interval for PFH. Results for
PFH and confidence interval for mission time of 20 years is given in
table 10. For PFH estimate for all mission times, see figure 36.
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Figure 36 – Calculation of PFH for different components configurations and mission times. The orange area
represents PL d, the red area represents PL e and the gray area has no correspondence in ISO 13849. For PFH
estimation according ISO 13849, PFH is estimated just for mission time of 20 years.
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4.5 ANALYSIS OF B10
For the ISO 13849 procedure, PFH calculation is valid only
within the B10 of each component. Result is the valve has to be changed
after reaching B10 switching cycles. Bosch Rexroth’s hydraulic valves
are normally designed to achieve B10 of 10 million switching cycles
(BOSCH REXROTH AG, 2012). After reaching this number of cycles,
valve should be changed.
Recalling the system description in section 4.1, the expected du-
ration of a cycle is 30s. Two cases are analyzed: 200 days or full year
of continuous operation.
4.5.1 Case 200 days of operation per year
B10 is measured in cycles. To convert this value into years, it
is necessary to estimate a mean operation frequency. ISO 13849-1
Annex C4 gives equations for estimating this frequency (International
Organisation for Standardization, 2006).
hop = 24 h
dop = 200 days
tcycle = 30 s
nop =
dop · hop · 3600
tcycle
= 200 · 24 · 360030 = 576000[
cycles/year] (4.3)
B10
nop
= 10000000[cycles]576000[cycles/year]
= 17.36years (4.4)
According to ISO 13849, valves must be replaced after approx.
17 years. However, for cases 1 and 2, it is possible to maintain even PL
e in a time of 20 years, without being necessary to replace the valves.
4.5.2 Case full year operation
In this case, time to replace the valves becomes lower.
hop = 24 h
dop = 365 days
tcycle = 30 s
nop =
dop · hop · 3600
tcycle
= 365 · 24 · 360030 = 1051200[
cycles/year] (4.5)
100
B10
nop
= 10000000[cycles]1051200[cycles/year]
= 9.51years (4.6)
While for case 1 and case 2 the calculated PFH lie around middle
of interval for PL e, in case 3 the calculated PFH lies to near to the
endpoint of interval. In fact, the upper PFH value is already outside
the PL e interval. A conservative approach is to consider this system
as reaching only PL d. A summary of achieved PL is given in Table
11.
While for case 1 and case 2 the calculated PFH lie around middle
of interval for PL e, in case 3 the calculated PFH lies to near to the
endpoint of interval. In fact, the upper PFH value is already outside
the PL e interval. A conservative approach is to consider this system
as reaching only PL d.
4.6 CALCULATION OF PFH FOR THE COMPLETE SAFETY
FUNCTION
With PFH value of the actuator subsystem, it is possible to
determine PFH and PL for the whole safety function. Values for the
pressure mat with controller and for the safety relay are given by the
component manufacturer.
PFH = PFHSensors + PFHLogic + PFHActuators (4.7)
Table 11 – Calculated PFH for the complete safety function
ISO 13849 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Calculated
PFH
1.09E-7 2.66E-8 4.61E-8 1.06E-7
Achieved PL d e e d
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5 APPLICATION OF PROPOSED METHOD IN AN
ENGINEERING PROJECT
The objective of this chapter is to analyze whether is feasible the
usage of the developed techniques in the industry by machine builders
and designers.
Safety functions are part of a bigger framework for risk reduction.
It is based on the European Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC, which
regulates the market of machinery in Europe, together with technical
standards for risk assessment and risk reduction. Machines shall not
pose hazards to people, and this is regulated by Essential Health and
Safety Requirements, EHSR, stated in the Machinery Directive (EU-
ROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
2006).
In this context, there is an effort in Bosch Rexroth to further
develop Motion Simulation Systems to achieve higher levels of safety
and improve documentation for the Machinery Directive. Therefor it
is desired to provided integrated safety functions. In that way, safety
functions are a ready-to-use product feature, reducing engineering effort
from the system integrator and increasing the economic value added.
Designing the system to some pre-programmed safety reactions, which
are compliant1up to a certain Performance Level (PL) or Safety In-
tergrity Level (SIL) facilitates the design for the system integrator.
The system provided by Bosch Rexroth is a 6 degrees-of-freedom
(DOF) motion platform, used for simulation of motion cues2 for flight
and driving simulation. Such platforms can be constructed in different
sizes, with hydraulic or electric actuators, depending on the desired
payload. An example of a motion platform can be seen in figure 37.
Motion cues are generated based on position, velocity and acceleration
set poitns received from a flight simulator, external to the platform.
The platform, due to its moving parts, is subjected to the Machinery
Directive.
However, due to the complexity of motion profiles of such sys-
tems, following current functional safety standards result in a poor PL
classification, due to the low PFH value reached. This low PFH value
is due to the pessimistic estimation proposed by the ISO 13849, as all
the 6 axes are considered simultaneously.
1In chapter 4, the pressure mat and the safety relay are components that are
designed to “supply” a safety function, with a PL rating and PFH value.
2Motion cue is illusion of movement for the human sensory system.
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Figure 37 – Motion simulation platform built by Bosch Rexroth.
In this context, intention of Bosch Rexroth is to adapt its prod-
ucts to the Machinery Directive, as well as train people to understand
and know how to design to following safety rules, laws, regulations and
requirements.
To comply with the mentioned objectives, the office in Boxtel,
the Netherlands, responsible for design and manufacture of motion plat-
forms, started a project for study of functional safety in motion simu-
lation systems. Objectives of this project are:
1. Improve documentation for the Machinery Directive;
2. Qualification building program for system designers;
3. Design integrated safety functions to facilitate integration to com-
plete systems;
4. Achieve better PL through more accurate PFH.
Methods proposed in chapter 3 of this work has direct application
to this project.
5.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
A complete flight simulator consists of motion and visual simu-
lation systems, in a replica of the control panel of a specific aircraft, as
well as a simulation software that calculates response of aircraft to the
controls.
Bosch Rexroth does not deliver complete flight simulators. Scope
of supply consists of:
• 6 DOF motion platform;
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• Cables;
• Control cabinet;
• Motion computer, that calculates inverse kinematics for the ac-
tuators.
It is intended for system integrator, that will add a cabin with
visual system and control panel. The cabin mimics a specific aircraft,
and is normally built to a specific customer. For an application, it
is still necessary to add cabin, simulation software and surroundings
installation, like fences and access means and safety sensors.
5.2 PROJECT DESCRIPTION
In order to achieve the desired goals, a proposal of activities for
the project is made. Each activity is discussed briefly in the following
sections.
5.2.1 Analysis of legal requirements
Depending on the intended market, different regulations must
be considered. The objective of the analysis is to identify which reg-
ulations must be considered. In the case of Europe, Machinery Di-
rective is mandatory, and local requirements may apply depending on
the country. In Brazil, products must fulfill requirements of Norma
Regulamentadora 12.
Inputs: Intended market.
Requirements: Knowledge about legal requirements.
Outputs: List of regulations.
5.2.1.1 Classification under Machinery Directive
A product may be classified as machinery or partly completed
machinery under the Machinery Directive (see appendix A). This clas-
sification impacts in the necessary documentation and even in the ap-
proval of the machinery.
Inputs: None.
Requirements: Knowledge on the Machinery Directive.
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Outputs: Decision of a product is classified whether as machin-
ery or partly completely machinery.
5.2.2 Identification of the state of the art in the technology
Identification of what is expected in terms of safety. This is
accomplished by comparison of similar products in the market, and
also by the available solutions. Some standards, in some countries,
have also normative requirements that must be taken into account.
Inputs: Intended market.
Requirements: None.
Outputs: Typical solutions available and typical required PL
or SIL for reference.
5.2.3 Identification of applicable standards
Inputs: None.
Requirements: Knowledge about standards.
Outputs: List of standards that may provide technical solutions
5.2.4 Risk assessment
Risk assessment should be performed according to ISO 12100 for
the machinery sector. As it is a comprehensive activity, it is subdivided
in other activities, that are detailed in the following subsections.
5.2.4.1 Description of the system
It is necessary for the team to identify which tasks are performed
on the system, during the whole life cycle. Therefore, not only design-
ers, but also end users and maintenance personal must be involved.
Inputs: None.
Requirements: A multidisciplinary team that involves end
users, assembly and maintenance personal and designers.
Outputs: A comprehensive description of the system
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5.2.4.2 Identification of tasks during whole life cycle
It is necessary for the team to identify which tasks are performed
on the system, during the whole life cycle. Therefore, not only design-
ers, but also end users and maintenance personal must be involved.
Inputs: Specifications, system description and preliminary con-
cept of the machinery, when available.
Requirements: A multidisciplinary team that involves end
users, assembly and maintenance personal and designers.
Outputs: A comprehensive description of the system
5.2.4.3 Identification of physical limits of machinery
This activity is basis for assignment of severity of hazards. It is
also basis for the operational limits, which must be in the documenta-
tion.
Inputs: Specifications, system description and preliminary con-
cept of the machinery, when available.
Requirements: A multidisciplinary team that involves end
users, assembly and maintenance personal and designers. Selection
of a multidisciplinary team is further discussed in section 5.2.7.
Outputs: Definition and documentation of the limits of the
machinery.
5.2.4.4 Identification of hazards
This task consists in understanding how an accident occurs and
to describe it systematically, in terms of source, events, life phase and
nature of the hazard.
Inputs: Annex B of ISO 12100. Other hazards lists from other
standards (specially C-type standards) provide an improved process.
Requirements: A copy of each standard.
Outputs: A list with all hazards occurring in all life phases.
5.2.4.5 Risk estimation
Assignment of risk parameters for each hazard, in order to prior-
itize risks to be reduced and to quantify the amount of risk reduction.
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Inputs: A list with all hazards occurring in all life phases.
Requirements: None.
Outputs: A list with a risk number for each hazard.
5.2.4.6 Risk evaluation
The decision whether a risk is acceptable or not is based on the
state of the art and on internal guidelines of the company;
Inputs: A list with all hazards occurring in all life phases, each
with a risk number.
Requirements: Comparison with existing solution and internal
guidelines.
Outputs: Decision to reduce risk associated to a hazard.
5.2.5 Design of safety function
For the hazards whose risk is not possible to be reduced by in-
herently safe design, safeguards and protective measures may be used.
If these measures rely on a control system, they shall be designed ac-
cording to ISO 13849. Following the 10 Steps to Performance Level
methodology (ORTH et al., 2012) helps to design safety functions. Nev-
ertheless, adoption of methods from chapter 3 of this work requires
additional steps. These additional steps are detailed in the following
sections.
5.2.5.1 Specify which hazards to reduce risks with each safety function
A single safety function may reduce risks associated to differ-
ent hazards. An analysis of which safety function reduces which risks
is necessary to quantify how much each risk is reduced, and whether
further risk reduction is necessary
Inputs: Risk assessment.
Requirements: None.
Outputs: A cross-correlation list of safety functions and haz-
ards.
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5.2.5.2 Define functional requirements for safety functions
Description of reaction times, in which operation mode each
function is active, priority of each function and behavior in case of fail-
ures. The 10 Steps to Performance Level methodology is recommended
for that, together with applicable C-type standards.
Inputs: Concept of each safety function.
Requirements: Output of activity 2 (state of the art) and ac-
tivity 3 (applicable standards).
Outputs: Detailed description of each safety function.
5.2.5.3 Define required PL of each safety function
Definition of the required PL of each safety function based of
the required amount of risk reduction. The amount of risk reduction is
defined in risk assessment, activity 4.
Inputs: Risk assessment (activity 4).
Requirements: Output of activity 2 (state of the art) and ac-
tivity 3 (applicable standards).
Outputs: The required PL of each safety function.
5.2.5.4 Design of the safety circuit
As the machinery has already a preliminary concept, with cir-
cuits for the realization of functions, it is possible to analyzed how the
safety reaction must act and design it, adding components if necessary.
Together with design, it is necessary to build a reliability model of the
safety function. Failure detection and tests must be specified as well.
Inputs: Schematic circuits of the machinery.
Requirements: Knowledge in design for functional safety,
knowledge in standards and knowledge in system reliability modeling
techniques.
Outputs: Updated schematics with safety related components,
proportion of detected failures and description of tests.
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5.2.5.5 Obtain field failure data for components
Field failure recordings must be available for the intended appli-
cation.
Inputs: List of safety related components.
Requirements: Availability of records of field failure data. The
company must implement a culture of surveillance of products.
Outputs: Field failure recordings.
5.2.5.6 Derive failure parameters from field data
From the recordings, it is necessary to fit data to a failure dis-
tribution.
Inputs: Field failure recordings.
Requirements: Knowledge in reliability analysis.
Outputs: Failure parameters for each component.
5.2.5.7 Calculation of PFH according to methods of chapter 3
Application of methods from chapter 3 and illustrated in chapter
4.
Inputs: Reliability model of the safety function (activity 5.4),
failure parameters (activity 5.6) and proportion of detected failures
(activity 5.4).
Requirements: Knowledge in system reliability and functional
safety.
Outputs: Estimate of PFH.
5.2.5.8 Verification of PL
Proof check of PFH calculation, verification whether the qualita-
tive requirements are fulfilled and if the achieved PL is equal or higher
than the required.
Inputs: Calculation of PFH, safety standards.
Requirements: Knowledge in functional safety and in the ma-
chinery.
Outputs: Decision whether the safety function meets the re-
quired PL or has to be redesigned.
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5.2.5.9 Testing of safety function for validation
Testing in a prototype whether the safety reaction is suitable,
in terms of the functional requirements, and check for unforeseeable
conditions.
Inputs: Detailed description of safety functions (activity 5.2).
Requirements: Existing prototype.
Outputs: Decision whether the safety function meets the func-
tional requirements.
5.2.5.10 Verification of achieved risk reduction
The required risk reduction, specified in the risk assessment,
must be checked.
Inputs: Designed safety function.
Requirements: Multidisciplinary team.
Outputs: Decision whether risk reduction provided by safety
function is enough.
5.2.6 Preparation of documentation
For compliance to the Machinery Directive, external and internal
documentation must be created. It is strongly recommended that each
individual activity is documented as they are executed, facilitating this
last activity.
5.2.7 Team definition
A multidisciplinary team is necessary for designing of a machin-
ery and compliance to safety regulations. This is necessary in order to
understand how the machinery interacts with people during its whole
life cycle, from conception until disposal. It is not necessary to assign
an employee for each of the points listed below, nor that all assigned
are present in every activity. However, it should be avoided to assign
only one employee for the whole process.
Knowledge necessary for the project:
• Knowledge in the technical system, to design solutions;
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• Knowledge in assembly, maintenance, commissioning, to identify
tasks and interaction of employees and machinery;
• Knowledge in risk assessment for moderation of meetings;
• Knowledge of requirements and regulations;
• Knowledge of system reliability modeling methods.
In order to apply the proposed method, it is necessary to have
more accurate failure data. Such data is normally not available. For
some companies, it is possible to perform an analysis of field failure of
similar applications, in order to obtain the failure data. For this case
it is necessary:
• Collection of field failure data;
• Knowledge of reliability analysis to calculate failure parameters;
5.3 IMPLEMENTATION
Due to organizational factors at Bosch Rexroth, was not possible
to conclude all activities of the project during the assigned time at
Boxtel. To the time of conclusion of this work, the project reached the
definition of safety function phase (activity 5.2). Results up to this
phase are presented in the following sections.
5.3.1 Classification under the Machinery Directive
It is clear that the motion platform is intended to used with a
cabin with visual system and control panel, what gives an impression of
partly completed machinery. However, it is possible to install only the
delivered equipment and generate hazardous movements by the manual
operation mode. As it could generate hazardous movements by itself,
it could be regarded as a machinery.
The important point of classifying as a machinery implies com-
pliance with all applicable health and safety requirements from the
Annex I from the Machinery Directive.
The platform makes hazardous movements, which are controlled
by its own control system and by external equipment. Therefore, re-
quirements over mechanical hazards and hazardous situations gener-
ated by the control system are applicable.
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Due to the scope of delivery, the system does not allow compli-
ance with some of the applicable requirements of Annex I. They are
listed below:
• Annex I, item 1.2.1. the protective devices must remain fully ef-
fective or give a stop command (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2006). As a risk re-
duction measure, it is recommended that protective devices are
used, like fences. These protective devices may have interlocks,
to give stop command to the system. However, as they do not
make part of the delivery, compliance with the item cannot be
assured.
• Annex I, item 1.3.9. Risk of uncontrolled movements. It is not
possible to ensure that the platform will not move uncontrollably,
as the control signals come from external parts.
This is represented in figure 38. While it is possible to design the
logic and output sub-functions of the safety function, input relies on
sensors which are not part of the delivery. Therefore, it is not possible
to ensure, for Bosch Rexorth, that the control system of the motion
platform fulfills all applicable EHSR.
Based on the argumentation above, the motion simulator has to
be regarded as partly completed machinery according to the European
Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC.
Figure 38 – Architecture of safety functions for motion platforms. Logic
and output sub-functions can be realized within the scope of the deliver;
input sub-function not.
Classification of the motion simulation system as partly com-
pleted machinery impacts in the work flow for compliance to the Ma-
chinery Directive. Based on appendix A, it becomes as represented in
figure 39.
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Figure 39 – Overview of activities for compliance to the Machinery
Directive
5.3.2 Risk Assessment
Risk assessment was the most time consuming part of the project
due to its scope. Annex B of ISO 12100 and Annex A of ISO 10218-
1 were used to identify and describe hazards. Risk parameters were
assigned to each hazard, and risk reduction measures were discussed.
5.3.3 Safety functions
For mechanical hazards that arises from uncontrolled move-
ments, safety functions were suggested:
• Maintenance position;
• Displacement limit of each actuator;
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• Safety-related stop;
• Avoidance of unexpected start-up;
• Speed limitation in special mode.
A discussion about applicability of the method and the activities
follows in the conclusion chapter.
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List of Activities:
Activity 1 - Analysis of legal requirements;
Activity 1.1 - Classification under Machinery Directive;
Activity 2 - Identification of the state of the art in the
technology;
Activity 3 - Identification of applicable standards;
Activity 4 - Risk assessment;
Activity 4.1 - Description of the system;
Activity 4.2 - Identification of tasks during whole life
cycle;
Activity 4.3 - Identification of physical limits of
Machinery;
Activity 4.4 - Identification of hazards;
Activity 4.5 - Risk estimation;
Activity 4.6 - Risk evaluation;
Activity 5 - Design of safety function;
Activity 5.1 - Specify which hazards to reduce risks with
each safety function;
Activity 5.2 - Define functional requirements for safety
functions;
Activity 5.3 - Define required PL of each safety function;
Activity 5.4 - Design of the safety circuit;
Activity 5.5 - Obtain field failure data for components;
Activity 5.6 - Derive failure parameters from field data;
Activity 5.7 - Calculation of PFH according to methods
of chapter 3;
Activity 5.8 - Verification of PL;
Activity 5.9 - Testing of safety function for validation;
Activity 5.10 - Verification of achieved risk reduction;
Activity 6 - Preparation of documentation;
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6 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, the develop methods, their importance, applica-
bility and limitations are discussed. At the end, suggestions for further
development in this field.
6.1 IMPORTANCE
Functional safety in the machinery sector has the objective of
reducing the number of work accidents and strive for health and safety
of employees. Regulations arose from this society demand, and increase
complexity of machinery design. Quantification of PFH is regarded as
a complex subject. In one hand, methods are difficult and simplicity is
necessary. The effort for small companies to build detailed reliability
models for a one-time design machine is burdensome. In the other
hand, calculations are not accurate, due to the restrictive hypothesis
used for modeling safety function as Markov processes.
What seems to be a dilemma has a common solution. Develop-
ment of sub-modules with integrated safety functions facilitates engi-
neering effort for small companies. Such sub-modules are not one-time
design, what justifies more effort in engineering, as in the case of the
motion simulation system.
This work addressed an open point in research of functional
safety, which is consideration of more accurate failure models for pneu-
matic, hydraulic and electromechanical components. Failure of such
components occur mostly due to aging mechanisms, e.g. wear-out and
corrosion, being concentrated at the end of product life. Models with
constant failure rate underestimate the average frequency of dangerous
failure per hour (PFH).
This work follows the line of works from Bosch Rexroth (refer to
section 1.6), being a sequence for Orth and Raksch (ORTH; RAKSCH,
2014). There, use of Weibull distribution is suggested, but for deriva-
tion of an Mean Time To dangerous Failures (MTTFd) value. This
present work enables usage of Weibull distribution, as proposed by
Orth and Raksch, directly for calculation of PFH for machines with
hydraulic control systems.
The objective proposed in section 1.8 was reached, with limita-
tions. A method for calculation of PFH, comprising modeling of the
safety function in reliability block diagrams (RBD) and discrete event
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simulation was proposed in chapter 3. In section 3.5 and in appendix
E, it is shown that the proposed method leads to similar results as sim-
plified method for PFH estimation of ISO 13849, for categories B, 1, 3
and 4. In section 3.6, Weibull distribution for failure of components of
a safety function is added to proposed method, also for categories B, 1,
3 and 4. In section 3.6 and in chapter 4, effects of Weibull distribution
on PFH of a safety function are analyzed. As a further advantage of
proposed method, it provides that capability of calculating PFH for
different mission times (different from 20 years).
Limitations of proposed method are due to assumptions made
to derivation of equations 3.16 to 3.25, presented in section 3.6 and
appendix D. The strongest and most limiting assumption is the same
shape factor βW for all failure modes, dangerous and safe. This as-
sumption is intended to supersede limitations of input data, which come
from field failure analysis (Weibull analysis). Availability of field failure
data is a limitation per se. Another limitation is related to derivation
of equations for block E, which were derived numerically.
Suggestions for overcome such limitations include access to more
detailed failure data, which enables to generate failure distribution from
field data analysis for each block individually. An exhaustive Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to derive accurate values for Diag-
nostic Coverage should be carried, to complement failure data. Due to
the high costs in development, it may not be suitable for small machine
builders and for one time designs. Additionally, percentage of common
cause failures (βCCF ) has to be better estimated.
As sub-products of this work, there are other contributions:
• Clarification of the meaning of PFH: There is a common misun-
derstanding in the machinery sector regarding reliability, avail-
ability, risk and PFH. An attempt to clarify differences and
relations of reliability and PFH is made through appendix B
and section 3.4. Additionally, appendix B is intended to clar-
ify that PFH is a measure for repairable systems (refer to section
sec:reliability), and shall not be mistaken with Mean Time To
Failure (MTTF), which is a measure for non-repairable systems.
• ISO 13849 is still not valid in Brazil. The current standard for
safety of machine controls is ABNT 14153, which is the national
counterpart of EN 954 (refer to section 1.4.1). This situation
is however to change. In 2010, the Norma Regulamentadora 12
(NR12) was reformulated, becoming closer to the Machinery Di-
rective 2006/42/EC (refer to appendix A. ISO 12100 was adopted
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as a national standard as ABNT ISO 12100 in December of 2013.
As it is part of framework of risk reduction of the Machinery Di-
rective, ISO 13849 is expected to be adopted as a national stan-
dard. In order to promote application of ISO 13849 in Brazil, this
work generated the publication: I. R. Kuhlhoff, U. F. Moreno,
and A. Orth. “Aplicac¸a˜o da Norma ISO 13849 de Seguranc¸a
Funcional de uma bancada de testes hidra´ulica”. Congresso Brazil
Automation 2014. Sa˜o Paulo/SP - Brazil. (KUHLHOFF; MORENO;
ORTH, 2014), with basics of the standard and a case study.
• A fist attempt to integrate functional safety activities and engi-
neer projects is made in chapter 5.
6.2 SUGGESTION FOR FUTURE WORKS
Proposed method achieved calculation of PFH with Weibull dis-
tributed failures, but with strong limitations. The method can be how-
ever adapted, by changing equations of step 3 of method presented in
section 3.4.
Legal requirements and modeling of category 2 of ISO 13849 are
still poorly understood. A deeper investigation is required, to under-
stand how to model effects of periodic tests, its relation with demand
and what is normative by the standard.
Common cause failures are regarded as one of the most impacting
factors in quantification of systems with high reliability. The Beta-
factor model, while simple, may be conservative. For systems with
more than two channels, the Beta-factor model is not recommended
(GOBLE, 2010). Therefore, a study of other models for estimation of
CCF are necessary for systems aiming high Performance Level (PL) or
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) values.
Estimation of PFH considers only physical failures of compo-
nents. A study of the impact of systematic failures is necessary, in
order to understand how it affects the quantification of PL.
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APPENDIX A -- Framework for safety of machinery
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Functional safety in the machinery sector belongs to a framework
for machinery safety. In this section, the basis of this framework is
explained.
A.1 EUROPEAN MACHINERY DIRECTIVE 2006/42/EC
For Europe, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union regulates aspects common aspects for the European Union, such
as safety regulations. From the Treaty, there are Directives that place
requirements on markets, that must be adopted as law by its country
members. In the field of machinery, there is the European Machinery
Directive 2006/42/EC that regulates the machinery market, putting re-
strictions and requirements on machinery, regulating the internal mar-
ket and the social safety protection of employees.
Figure 40 – Work flow for implementation of Machinery Directive for
machinery and partly completed machinery. Adapted from the Guide
for the Machinery Directive(GUIDE. . . , 2010) and Orth(ORTH et al.,
2012).
In order to be sold and commercialized in Europe, machinery
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must have the CE mark affixed to it. The mark is affixed by the
manufacturer, who must prove that machinery fulfill the Essential
Health and Safety Requirements, EHSR, which strive for the
protection of employees.
The Machinery Directive was made in order to ensure safety of
users, during all the life cycle of machinery, as well as for all machin-
ery. To cover all the cases, it has an abstract structure and additional
requirements for different types of products.
One of the innovations of the Machinery Directive is that it
coined the term partly completed machinery. It is a denomina-
tion that is intended to cover subsystem and modules that, although
cannot fulfill a function and therefore are not directly commercialized to
end users, they are sold and incorporated in bigger machines. As such
subsystem may pose hazards as well due to design and manufactur-
ing problems, its manufacturer is made responsible by the Machinery
Directive.
The Directive applies to: machinery; interchangeable equipment;
safety components; lifting accessories: chains, ropes and webbing; re-
movable mechanical transmission devices and partly completed ma-
chinery. All of them are classified as machinery, except for the partly
completed machinery. In that way, a product can be classified either
as:
• machinery: an assembly, fitted with or intended to be fitted with
a drive system other than directly applied human or animal effort,
consisting of linked parts or components, at least one of which
moves, and which are joined together for a specific application
(EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION, 2006), or
• partly completed machinery: means an assembly which is al-
most machinery but which cannot in itself perform a specific ap-
plication. A drive system is partly completed machinery. Partly
completed machinery is only intended to be incorporated into or
assembled with other machinery or other partly completed ma-
chinery or equipment, thereby forming machinery to which this
Directive applies (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2006).
According to the classification of a product under the Directive,
it has different requirements and work flow, different documents and
shall or shall not receive the CE marking. These different work flows,
technical documentation are represented in figure 40.
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The Machinery Directive define a legal framework for safety of
machinery. That is, requirements in a abstract level. Standards are
support elements that give a technical solution that fulfill all/part of
the requirements.
Standards listed in the Official Journal of the European
Union1are regarded as harmonised standards. This denomination
means that there is the presumption of conformity principle (is
valid). The presumption of conformity effect means that once that the
standard is applied, the respective EHSR is fulfilled, being not neces-
sary for the builder to prove each individual requirement by its own.
For the machinery directive, there is a well established structure
of harmonised standards2. This structure is defined by type A, B and
C standards.
• type-A standards(basic safety standards) giving basic concepts,
principles and general aspects that can be applied to machinery;
• type-B standards(generic safety standards) dealing with one
safety aspect or one type of safeguard that can be used across
a wide range of machinery;
• type-B1 standards on particular safety aspects (for example, safety
distances, surface temperature, noise);
• type-B2 standards on safeguards (for example, two-hand controls,
interlocking devices, pressure-sensitive devices, guards);
• type-C standards(machine safety standards) dealing with de-
tailed safety requirements for a particular machine or group of
machines;
When requirements of standards diverge from each other, type-C
standards have priority over type-B, which have priority over type-A.
A.2 RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK REDUCTION - ISO 12100
For the Machinery Directive, it is of most importance to perform
a risk assessment. It is used as basis to systematically identify hazards
and reduce risks. As represented in figure 40, the red blocks are start of
1http://eur-lex.europa.eu/oj/direct-access.html
2URL for MD harmonised standards: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/european-
standards/harmonised-standards/machinery/index en.htm
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risk assessment process, whose results are necessary for the blue blocks,
proving that the EHSR are fulfilled.
ISO 12100 standard is a A-type harmonised standard. It de-
scribes a systematic risk assessment work flow for the machinery sector.
It consists of five steps (International Organisation for Standardization, 2010):
1. Determine the of limits of the machinery, including the intended
use and any reasonably foreseeable misuse;
2. Identify of hazards and associated hazardous situations;
3. Estimate the risk for each identified hazard and hazardous situa-
tion;
4. Evaluate the risk and decision taking about the need for risk
reduction;
5. Elimination of the hazard or reduce the risk associated with the
hazard by means of protective measures.
The standard provide guidance for each step. Annex B has a list of
hazards and hazardous situations, helping designers to identify and
describe them in a organized way.
Risk reduction, as recommended by ISO 12100, consists of adopt-
ing 3 hierarchical steps. They are:
1. Inherently safe design measures;
2. Safeguarding and/or complementary protective measures;
3. Information for use.
The reason for this prioritization is the effectiveness of the mea-
sures. More effective measures shall be applied first, aiming at remov-
ing unnecessary hazards, and just then are applied measures to reduce
frequency of occurrence of accidents by safeguarding and information.
For each of the risk reduction steps, other standards are sug-
gested, for specific types of hazards or protective measures. For exam-
ple, ISO 13857 is recommended for gaps between moving parts, avoiding
that body parts can enter in it; ISO/TR 11688-1 is recommended for
reduction of noise emission.
For safeguarding measures that rely on a control system, ISO
13849 is suggested for the design of the safety-related control system.
Figure 41 represents graphically this relation. From the risk assessment
comes input information necessary for design, and output of ISO 13849
design process returns for ISO 12100 in order to check if risk reduction
is achieved.
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Figure 41 – Relation of ISO 13849 to ISO 12100. Extracted from
ISO/TR 22100-2 (International Organisation for Standardization, 2013).
A.3 FUNCTIONAL SAFETY IN THE MACHINERY SECTOR -
THE ISO 13849
ISO 13849 standard is a B1-type harmonised standard. Risk
assessment and reduction is defined by ISO 12100, whereas ISO 13849
define design procedures and requirements for one specific kind of risk
reduction measures. Compliance to ISO 13849 is important, however
not enough to guarantee a safe machine.
Difference of scope of standards is represented in figure 42.
Figure 42 – Scope of ISO 12100 compared to ISO 13849
Considering the ISO 12100 and the ISO 13849 standards in the
Machinery Directive, the work flow figure can be update, as in figure
43. The methodology 10 Steps to Performance Level(ORTH et al., 2012)
is recommended for compliance with ISO 13849.
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Figure 43 – Updated work flow for compliance with Machinery Direc-
tive, considering ISO 12100 and ISO 13849 standards.
A.4 BRAZILIAN FRAMEWORK FOR MACHINERY SAFETY
In Brazil, machinery must comply to the Norma Regulamen-
tadora 12, NR12 for short, which is adopted as law. The NR12
pose health and safety requirements in machinery, in order to provide
a safe workplace for employees and user. Its last major review in 2010
(MINISTERIO DO TRABALHO E EMPREGO, 2013) assigned a bigger re-
sponsibility to machine builders and designers, that must prove that
machinery is safe in the whole life cycle. It defines also that old ma-
chines must be adapted to new requirements.
The NR12 assign some standards that are mandatory, in order
to ensure safety of machinery. Standards adopted are issued by the
Brazilian Association for Technical Standardization, the Associac¸a˜o
Brasileira de Normas Te´cnicas, ABNT. The ABNT, as a member
of the International Organization for Standardization, ISO, is
in process of adoption of ISO standards.
APPENDIX B -- Intuitive interpretation of PFDavg and
PFH
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PFDavg and PFH are characteristic of the safety function, which
quantify the incidence of potential accidents caused by dangerous fail-
ure of the components. Functional safety standards determine it
through reliability of components. Nevertheless, it still relates to other
characteristics, as detection of failures and demand of function. The
difference between PFDavg and PFH depends on these characteristics.
In the following pictures, an interpretation for PFDavg and PFH is
given, in a system’s perspective. Even that PFDavg is not used in the
machinery sector, it is important to understand the difference between
the two concepts, to avoid misunderstanding.
It is assumed that demands are instantaneous, i.e. a demand has
no duration, or very short duration that it can be regard as instanta-
neous. The reason for that is that demands in the machinery sector
are short in relation to mission time.
Another important point is that safety functions are repairable.
In the event of a failure, the safety function must be repaired, to main-
tain the safe operation. This is achieved by changing failed compo-
nents. Components fail and are replaced. Control systems fail and are
repaired through replacement of components. Therefore, both PFDavg
and PFH reflect this characteristic of repair.
Figure 44 – Demand of safety function in different system conditions
The hypothetical situation of figure 44 represents a hazardous
situation that is intended to be reduced or avoided. In the time frame
of one year, there is the time where the safety function is available and
some time that it is not, that is, it has failed without notice. A demand
represents a dangerous event which has been made safe through the
reaction of the control system. However, after some time, the safety
function fails unnoticed, and a further demand is not made safe.
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Figure 45 – Demand as a failure identification process
In the case of figure 45, it can be seen that the demand, apart
from the possibly bad consequences, also reveals the dormant failure
of the control system. In this case, after the failure has been detected,
the safety function can be restored to functioning. The proportion
of time that the safety function remains unavailable to the total time
is a reliability metric of safety systems, called PFD. PFD stands for
probability of failure on demand, and can be interpreted as:
PFDavg =
MDT
MUT +MDT
(B.1)
Where MDT means Mean Downtime and MUT means Mean Uptime.
The higher the downtime proportion to the total time, the higher
the probability of a random demand occur in a time that the safety
function is unavailable. This proportion is what is desired to be reduced
in the design of a safety control system.
In the case that the demands are much more frequent, as in the
figure 46, failures do not stay much time in the failed state. That is,
after a failure has occurred, it will be probably discovered soon. This
drastically reduces the proportion of unavailable time of the safety func-
tion to the total time. In the limit, when the demands are continuous,
the downtime of each failure collapses to the restoration time1.
Using the PFDavg for evaluating the integrity of the safety func-
tion in this case may cause false impressions. Even that the PFDavg
will become much lower, it is due to the high demand. That is, the
downtime is lower, but the likelihood of an accident remains the same.
Measuring the proportion of the downtime in this case becomes mislead-
1which is many orders of magnitude lower than the uptime, being close to zero
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Figure 46 – Increase in demand rate causes the failures to be identified
sooner
ing. The downtime becomes much smaller, giving the false impression
of an increase of safety integrity. Users may think that the hardware
has increase ability to withstand dangerous failures. But what really
happens is that failures are detected faster due to the high demand,
leading to smaller times with dormant (non-detected) failures.
Therefore, a different measure is need to evaluate this case. It is
used the PFH, the average frequency of failure, which can be interpreted
as:
PFH =
N(t)
MUT +MDT
=
N(t)
Totaltime
(B.2)
Where N(t) is the number of times that the safety function fails in a
dangerous mode.
In the limit case that the downtime of each failure collapses to
zero2, the transition of being available to unavailable can lead to an
accident and this measure is assessed3.
To reduce de facto the incidence of failures, other measures have
to be taken. Figure 47 a situation closer to reality. In order to reduce
incidence of dangerous failures leaving the system without protection,
failure detection capability is added to the safety function. Dangerous
failures detected before a demand occurs do not count to calculation of
PFH, therefore reducing it.
This difference in PFD and PFH reflects also in the failure modes
which are more relevant for each case. In PFD, with low-demand, the
2if the restoration time is zero
3This is the continuous operation mode of the IEC 61508
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system remains static for a long time, what makes it prone to failure
modes as corrosion, deposit, sticking, etc. In PFH systems, functions
are prone to fatigue and wear failure modes, as abrasion, friction, etc.
Figure 47 – Use of on-line tests to reveal failures before a demand occurs
From the figures 44, 45, 46 and 47 and the related explanation, an
intuitive idea of PFH was built. This interpretation is used in chapter
3 for setting up simulation parameters.
APPENDIX C -- Deduction of equation for the number of
simulations
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This section is dedicated to deduct equation 3.2, for determina-
tion of the number of simulation needed to achieve the required preci-
sion for PFH.
The higher the safety requirements, the lower frequency of fail-
ures is tolerable. Therefore, it must be shown that the components
reach a very low frequency of failure.
In order not to allow numeric errors in the computation of PFH
through simulation, it is necessary to determine the minimum number
of runs that is needed to achieve such low PFH.
PFH is calculated through expected number of failures, as equa-
tion 2.29.
BlockSim calculates the expected number of failures by averaging
the number of failures. That is, if 1000 runs are made, the number of
failures is counted and divided by 1000 (number of runs).
Each run can be viewed as a Poisson process.
Let N(t) be a counting process. Each time a failure of the safety
function occurs, N(t) is incremented by 1. N(t) denotes the number of
failures in each run.
The expected number of failures E(N(t)) is obtained estimated
by averaging the number of failures N(t) for each of the N runs, for the
time point t.
Eˆ(N(t)) =
1
N
N∑
i
Ni(t) (C.1)
Where Eˆ(N(t)) is an estimate for the expected number of failures at
time t, N is the number of simulations and Ni(t) is the number of
failure of the simulation/run i at time t.
It is important to note that the domain of Ni(t) is the set of
natural numbers N, while the domain of Eˆ(N(t)) is the set of non-
negative real numbers R+0 .
The smallest non-zero number that Ni(t) can assume is 1. As N
is finite, the smallest number that Eˆ(N(t)) can reach is determined by
N. As the number of failures increases, Eˆ(N(t)) also increases, always
by an increment of 1/N .
Let N denote the increment 1/N . Substituting the Eˆ(N(t)) in
equation 2.29 results in
1
TM
Eˆ(N(TM)) =
1
TM
N (C.2)
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which is the smallest increment for PFH, denoted as PFH . It is a
function of the mission time and the number of simulations.
Rewriting equation C.2 in terms PFH , N and TM leads to
N =
1
PFH · TM
(C.3)
PFH values in table K.1 from ISO 13849 are represented in sci-
entific notation, with two decimal places. The PFH of the calculated
PFH is desired to be of one order of magnitude lower than the second
decimal place, or alternatively, 3 orders of magnitude lower than the
target PFH value. That is:
PFH = 10−3 · PFHtarget (C.4)
Substituting equation C.4 in C.3
N =
1
10−3 · PFHtarget · TM
(C.5)
From equation C.3, it can be seen that precision of PFH calcu-
lation is dependent of the increment PFH and the mission time TM .
Therefrom arises an effect of compromise: the lower the mission time
to be considered, the higher has to be the number of simulations. This
conclusion is based on absolute values of PFH and TM . Consideration
of Weibull distribution with βW higher than one1makes failure to hap-
pen more concentrated to the end of mission time, with fewer failures
at the beginning of the mission time. To compensate this effect, it is
necessary to increase further the number of simulations.
1shape factor βW higher than one means that failures concentrate in the end of
lifetime; this effect increases as the βW increases.
APPENDIX D -- Deduction of equations for failure
parameters of the 5-block model
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A B
Figure 48 – Block diagram of a series system with two blocks
In this model, each block does not represent a single component.
Blocks model rather failure modes of a component. However, reliability
data is available only to components, and not to its individual failure
modes. Parameters of failure distribution for each block are derived
from the failure distribution parameters of the components. The pa-
rameters diagnostic coverage (DC) and common cause failures factor
(β -factor model) are used to split the percentage of failures according
to each failure mode. The basis hypothesis is that all failure modes
have the same shape factor (β of the Weibull distribution), and that
it is possible to adjust the characteristic lifetime (η of the Weibull dis-
tribution) to correspond to the percentage of failures. This is based on
the theorem below.
D.1 THEOREM
A 2-parameteric Weibull distribution can be decomposed in two
other 2-parametric Weibull distributions with the same shape factor
(β) by two fractions summing to one.
D.1.1 Proof
Consider the following system S, with components A and B con-
nected in series, and its reliability block diagram is given in figure 48.
Reliability of a series system is given by:
RS(t) = RA(t) ·RB(t) (D.1)
Let’s assume that the reliability function of the system S is
known and that it is described by a 2-parametric Weibull distribution.
RS(t) = e−(
t
ηS
)βS (D.2)
Assume that reliability of components A and B is also described
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by a 2-parametric Weibull distribution. So:
RA(t) = e−(
t
ηA
)βA
and RB(t) = e−(
t
ηB
)βB (D.3)
e
−( tηS )
βS = e−(
t
ηA
)βA · e−( tηB )βB (D.4)
e
−( tηS )
βS = e−[(
t
ηA
)βA+( tηB )
βB ] (D.5)
−( t
ηS
)βS = −[( t
ηA
)βA + (
t
ηB
)βB ] (D.6)
Assume that the Weibull distribution of both components has
the same shape factor as the system’s distribution.
−( t
ηS
)βS = −[( t
ηA
)βS + (
t
ηB
)βS ] (D.7)
Let
ηA =
ηS
a
( 1βS )
and ηB =
ηS
b
( 1βS )
(D.8)
Replacing D.8 in D.7
−( t
ηS
)βS = −[a( t
ηS
)βS + b(
t
ηS
)βS ] (D.9)
−( t
ηS
)βS = −[(a+ b) · ( t
ηS
)βS ] (D.10)
Finally:
1 = (a+ b) (D.11)
D.2 DIVISION OF RELIABILITY PARAMETERS
49 represents necessary data for the model, as well as the avail-
able data.
From equation D.11 follows that any combination of a and b that
sums to one satisfy the hypothesis of a Weibull distribution being de-
composable into two Weibull distributions with the same shape factor.
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Figure 49 – Division of failures into different failure modes. Trape-
zoidal form are the available data, rounded rectangles are required data;
dashed rectangles are only supporting understanding relations between
failure modes.
Choosing a = DC and b = 1−DC back in equation D.9
−( t
ηS
)βS = −[DC( t
ηS
)βS + (1−DC)( t
ηS
)βS ] (D.12)
RS(t) = e−(DC
t
ηS
)βS · e−((1−DC) tηS )βS (D.13)
Reliability of a component is split in two distributions, according
to DC. It is possible to calculate an equivalent characteristic lifetime
(η) with D.8. Similar reasoning is applied to common cause failures.
For independent DD and DU failures, an additional factor is applied,
(1− βCCF ). Applying it back in D.8
ηA =
ηS
[DC · (1− βCCF )](
1
βS
) (D.14)
ηB =
ηS
[(1−DC) · (1− βCCF )](
1
βS
) (D.15)
For deriving failure parameters for common cause failures, an
additional step is needed. The CCF factor is not applied to an indi-
vidual component failure distribution, but to the whole safety function
failure distribution. Therefore, it is necessary to estimate an equivalent
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system failure distribution. This equivalent system failure distribution
is obtained through BlockSim. A parallel system with input compo-
nents (trapezoidal forms from 49) is build and failure probability is
calculated for various lifetime points. A 2-parametric Weibull distri-
bution is chosen to fit those points. This Weibull distribution assumes
ηAUX and βAUX . From this distribution, it is possible to calculate
parameters for the CCF distribution. Following the condition on the
shape parameter:
βW,CCF = βW,AUX (D.16)
And, for the characteristic lifetime:
ηCCF =
ηAUX
β
( 1βW,AUX )
CCF
(D.17)
APPENDIX E -- Analysis of error for validation
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E.1 RESULTS VALIDATION METHODS
In order to evaluate the calculation methods, there are some
metrics the obtained results. The metrics are presented, percentage
error and PFH intervals for a PL.
E.1.1 Percentage error
This measure is calculated by:
E% =
|PFHcalculated − PFHISO|
PFHISO
(E.1)
The percentage error takes into account the order of magnitude
of each quantity.
A weakness of this measures is that there is no reference of what
is an acceptable percentage error. A second weakness of this measure
is that it does not reflect the division of PL into intervals of PFH. In
this sense, an error of 20% may be low, when the reference PFH is in
the middle of the interval (e.g. 3 ·10−7 [1/h]), but an error of 5% may
be prohibitive, when the reference PFH is near the boundaries of other
PL interval (e.g. 1.01 · 10−7 [1/h]) and leads to a different PL (being
too much optimistic about PL estimate).
E.1.2 PFH intervals for a PL
This measure analyzes whether the calculated PFH value reaches
the same PL of the reference PFH. No error measure must be calculated.
This measure reflects the intervals characteristic of PL. A dis-
advantage of this measure is that it may mask errors in calculation,
specially systematic errors. Therefore, poor results or poor calcula-
tions can be validated, when the result could be easily improved.
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E.2 RESULTS OF PFH CALCULATION
E.2.1 Category B or 1
Category B and 1 use the same calculation model. In fact, the
difference between these categories is the range of MTTFd values. Ta-
ble 12 shows calculated and reference values. They are graphically
displayed in figure 26 as well, reproduced at the end of this appendix
for convenience.
Table 12 – Comparison between PFH values for category B and 1
Category B Category 1
MTTFd ISO 13849 Calculated Error ISO 13849 Calculated Error
3 3.80E-05 3.81E-05 0.2% - - -
3.3 3.46E-05 3.46E-05 0.0% - - -
3.6 3.17E-05 3.16E-05 -0.2% - - -
3.9 2.93E-05 2.93E-05 0.0% - - -
4.3 2.65E-05 2.66E-05 0.4% - - -
4.7 2.43E-05 2.43E-05 0.0% - - -
5.1 2.24E-05 2.24E-05 -0.1% - - -
5.6 2.04E-05 2.04E-05 0.1% - - -
6.2 1.84E-05 1.84E-05 -0.1% - - -
6.8 1.68E-05 1.67E-05 -0.4% - - -
7.5 1.52E-05 1.52E-05 -0.2% - - -
8.2 1.39E-05 1.39E-05 0.0% - - -
9.1 1.25E-05 1.25E-05 0.3% - - -
10 1.14E-05 1.14E-05 0.2% - - -
11 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 -0.3% - - -
12 9.51E-06 9.50E-06 -0.1% - - -
13 8.78E-06 8.76E-06 -0.2% - - -
15 7.61E-06 7.60E-06 -0.1% - - -
16 7.13E-06 7.11E-06 -0.3% - - -
18 6.34E-06 6.33E-06 -0.1% - - -
20 5.71E-06 5.71E-06 0.1% - - -
22 5.19E-06 5.19E-06 -0.1% - - -
24 4.76E-06 4.76E-06 0.0% - - -
27 4.23E-06 4.24E-06 0.1% - - -
30 - - - 3.80E-06 3.83E-06 0.7%
33 - - - 3.46E-06 3.47E-06 0.4%
36 - - - 3.17E-06 3.18E-06 0.4%
39 - - - 2.93E-06 2.94E-06 0.3%
43 - - - 2.65E-06 2.66E-06 0.5%
47 - - - 2.43E-06 2.44E-06 0.5%
51 - - - 2.24E-06 2.25E-06 0.5%
56 - - - 2.04E-06 2.05E-06 0.6%
Continued on next page
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Table 12 – continued from previous page
MTTFd ISO 13849 Calculated Error ISO 13849 Calculated Error
62 - - - 1.84E-06 1.86E-06 1.1%
68 - - - 1.68E-06 1.69E-06 0.5%
75 - - - 1.52E-06 1.53E-06 0.9%
82 - - - 1.39E-06 1.40E-06 0.8%
91 - - - 1.25E-06 1.26E-06 1.0%
100 - - - 1.14E-06 1.15E-06 0.8%
E.2.2 Category 3
Table 13 shows calculated and reference values.
Table 13 – Comparison between PFH values for category 3
Category 3 with DCavg of 60% Category 3 with DCavg of 90%
MTTFd ISO 13849 Calculated Error ISO 13849 Calculated Error
3 1.26E-05 1.58E-05 25.3% 6.09E-06 6.11E-06 0.4%
3.3 1.13E-05 1.42E-05 25.9% 5.41E-06 5.49E-06 1.5%
3.6 1.03E-05 1.29E-05 25.5% 4.86E-06 5.01E-06 3.0%
3.9 9.37E-06 1.19E-05 26.6% 4.40E-06 4.54E-06 3.1%
4.3 8.39E-06 1.06E-05 26.6% 3.89E-06 4.03E-06 3.5%
4.7 7.58E-06 9.55E-06 25.9% 3.48E-06 3.63E-06 4.2%
5.1 6.91E-06 8.76E-06 26.8% 3.15E-06 3.29E-06 4.3%
5.6 6.21E-06 7.80E-06 25.6% 2.80E-06 2.97E-06 6.1%
6.2 5.53E-06 6.91E-06 25.0% 2.47E-06 2.59E-06 4.9%
6.8 4.98E-06 6.22E-06 24.8% 2.20E-06 2.30E-06 4.3%
7.5 4.45E-06 5.50E-06 23.6% 1.95E-06 2.04E-06 4.6%
8.2 4.02E-06 4.91E-06 22.2% 1.74E-06 1.80E-06 3.2%
9.1 3.57E-06 4.29E-06 20.2% 1.53E-06 1.59E-06 1.7%
10 3.21E-06 3.84E-06 19.7% 1.36E-06 1.37E-06 0.5%
11 2.81E-06 3.34E-06 19.0% 1.18E-06 1.20E-06 1.6%
12 2.49E-06 2.99E-06 20.1% 1.04E-06 1.06E-06 1.6%
13 2.23E-06 2.66E-06 19.% 9.21E-07 9.35E-07 1.5%
15 1.82E-06 2.18E-06 19.7% 7.44E-07 7.45E-07 0.2%
16 1.67E-06 1.96E-06 17.5% 6.76E-07 6.99E-07 3.3%
18 1.41E-06 1.66E-06 18.0% 5.76E-07 5.85E-07 1.6%
20 1.22E-06 1.41E-06 15.5% 4.85E-07 5.02E-07 3.6%
22 1.07E-06 1.26E-06 17.4% 4.21E-07 4.29E-07 2.0%
24 9.47E-07 1.10E-06 15.9% 3.70E-07 3.74-07 1.0%
27 8.04E-07 9.06E-07 12.7% 3.10E-07 3.15E-07 1.6%
30 6.94E-07 7.75E-07 11.6% 2.65E-07 2.72E-07 2.7%
33 5.94E-07 6.45E-07 8.6% 2.30E-07 2.31E-07 0.3%
36 5.16E-07 5.54E-07 7.4% 2.01E-07 2.05E-07 1.9%
Continued on next page
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Table 13 – continued from previous page
MTTFd ISO 13849 Calculated Error ISO 13849 Calculated Error
39 4.53E-07 4.74E-07 4.6% 1.78E-07 1.79E-07 0.7%
43 3.87E-07 4.12E-07 6.6% 1.54E-07 1.49E-07 -3.3%
47 3.35E-07 3.62E-07 8.2% 1.34E-07 1.15E-07 1.0%
51 2.93E-07 3.10E-07 5.9% 1.19E-07 1.15E-07 -3.1%
56 2.52E-07 2.61E-07 3.6% 1.03E-07 1.03E-07 0.3%
62 2.13E-07 2.22E-07 4.3% 8.84E-08 8.62E-08 -2.5%
68 1.84E-07 1.92E-07 4.6% 7.68E-08 7.93E-08 3.3%
75 1.57E-07 1.61E-07 3.2% 6.62E-08 6.91E-08 4.3%
82 1.35E-07 1.37E-07 1.2% 5.79E-08 5.59E-08 -3.4%
91 1.14E-07 1.12E-07 -1.4% 4.94E-08 4.79E-08 -2.9%
100 1.01E-07 1.00E-07 -0.9% 4.29E-08 4.22E-08 -1.5%
E.2.3 Category 4
Table 14 shows calculated and reference values.
Table 14 – Comparison between PFH values for category 4
Category 4
MTTFd ISO 13849 Calculated Error
30 9.54E-08 9.65E-08 1.1%
33 8.57E-08 8.90E-08 3.9%
36 7.77E-08 7.76E-08 -0.1%
39 7.11E-08 7.08E-08 -0.5%
43 6.37E-08 6.34E-08 -0.5%
47 5.76E-08 5.54E-08 -3.9%
51 5.26E-08 5.25E-08 -0.2%
56 4.73E-08 4.79E-08 1.4%
62 4.22E-08 4.22E-08 0.1%
68 3.80E-08 3.60E-08 -5.4%
75 3.41E-08 3.42E-08 0.4%
82 3.08E-08 3.42E-08 11.2%
91 2.74E-08 2.88E-08 5.0%
100 2.47E-08 2.45E-08 -0.6%
149
10−810−710−610−510−4
101
102
PFH [Failures/h]
M
T
T
F
d
[
y
e
a
r
s
]
ISO 13849 category B
Calculated category B
ISO 13849 category 1
Calculated category 1
ISO 13849 category 3 DCavg 60%
Calculated category 3 DCavg 60%
ISO 13849 category 3 DCavg 90%
Calculated category 3 DCavg 90%
ISO 13849 category 4
Calculated category 4
Figure 50 – Reproduction of figure 26. Comparison of PFH values of ISO 13849 and calculated through BlockSim
for all calculated categories. Intervals that represent different Performance Levels are shaded in different colors.
150
151
REFERENCES
BILLINTON, R.; ALLAN, R. N. Reliability Evaluation of Engineering
Systems - Concepts and Techniques. [S.l.]: Springer, 1992. ISBN
978-0306440632.
BOSCH REXROTH AG. Reliability characteristics MTTFd for
functional safety according to EN ISO 13849. [S.l.], 3 2012.
BUJA, G.; MENIS, R. Dependability and functional safety. IEEE
Industrial Electronics Magazine, p. 4–12, 2012.
DIAS, A. et al. Metodologia para ana´lise de risco : mitigac¸a˜o de perda
de SF6 em disjuntores. [S.l.]: Eletrosul, 2013. ISBN 978-85-98128-42-9.
DORRA, M.; REINERT, D. Annex 6: Quantitative Analysis of
Complex Electronic Systems using Fault Tree Analysis and Markov
Modelling. [S.l.], February 2000.
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION. Directive 2006/42/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on machinery, and
amending Directive 95/16/EC. 2006.
GOBLE, W. M. Control Systems Safety and Reliability. Third edition.
[S.l.]: ISA, 2010.
GONZALEZ, F. E. Estudo das forc¸as atuantes em mecanismos
de regulac¸a˜o de aˆngulo de passo e desenvolvimento de um sistema
emulador de cargas. mathesis — Universidade Federal de Santa
Catarina, 2012.
GUIDE to application of the Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC. [S.l.],
June 2010.
HAUKE, M. et al. Functional machine of machine controls -
Application of EN ISO 13849 -. [S.l.], June 2009. Dispon´ıvel em:
<http://www.dguv.de/ifa/Publikationen/Reports-Download/BGIA-
Reports-2007-bis-2008/BGIA-Report-2-2008/index-2.jsp>.
IAEA. Accidental overexposure of radiotherapy patients in San Jose,
Costa Rica. Vienna, June 1998.
152
INNAL, F. et al. New insight into the average probability of failure
on demand and the probability of dangerous failure per hour of safety
instrumented systems. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical
Engineers, Part O: Journal of Risk and Reliability, v. 224, p. 75–86,
2010.
International Electrotechnical Comission. IEC 61508-4 ed2.0 -
Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic
safety-related systems - Part 4: Definitions and abbreviations. 2010.
International Electrotechnical Comission. IEC 61508-6 ed2.0 -
Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic
safety-related systems - Part 6: Guidelines on the application of IEC
61508-2 and IEC 61508-3. 2010.
International Organisation for Standardization. ISO 13849-1:2006 -
Safety of machinery - Safety-related parts of control systems - Part 1:
General principles for design. 2006.
International Organisation for Standardization. ISO 12100:2010 -
Safety of machinery - General principles for design - Risk assessment
and risk reduction. 2010.
International Organisation for Standardization. ISO/TR 22100-2:2013
- Safety of machinery - Relationship with ISO 12100 - Part 2: How
ISO 12100 relates to ISO 13849-1. 2013.
JIN, H. A contribution to reliability assessment of safety-instrumented
systems. Tese (Doutorado) — Norwegian University of Science and
Technology, 2013.
JOCELYN, S. et al. Feasibility study and uncertainties in the
validation of an existing safety-related control circuit with the iso
13849-1:2006 design standard. Reliability Engineering and System
Safety, v. 121, p. 104–112, 2014.
KUHLHOFF, I. R.; MORENO, U. F.; ORTH, A. Aplicac¸a˜o da norma
iso 13849 de seguranc¸a funcional de uma bancada de testes hidra´ulica.
In: Anais do congresso Brazil Automation 2014. [S.l.: s.n.], 2014.
KUMAMOTO, H.; HENLEY, E. J. Probabilistic Risk Assessment and
Management for Engineers and Scientists. [S.l.]: Wiley-IEEE Press,
2000. 620 p. ISBN 0780360176.
153
LERe´Ve´REND, P. Inside the standardization jungle: Iec 62061 and
iso 13849-1, complementary or competing? In: . [S.l.: s.n.], 2008.
p. 1–5.
LEVESON, N. Medical devices: The therac-25. In: Safeware: System
Safet and Computers. Addison-Wesley, 1995. ISBN 0-201-11972-2.
Dispon´ıvel em: <http://sunnyday.mit.edu/>.
MIKELSONS, L.; SU, Z. Simulation for verification and validation of
functional safety. In: Proceedings of the 10th International Modelica
Conference. [S.l.: s.n.], 2014.
MINISTe´RIO DA PREVIDeˆNCIA SOCIAL. Anua´rio Estat´ıstico da
Prevideˆncia Social 2013. [S.l.], 2014.
MINISTERIO DO TRABALHO E EMPREGO. Portaria n 1.893 de
9 de dezembro de 2013 - NR 12. Altera a Norma Regulamentadora
NR12 - Seguranca no trabalho em maquinas e equipamentos. 2013.
NEGRI, V. J. de. Introduc¸a˜o aos Sistemas para Automac¸a˜o e Controle
Indutrial. 2005.
NTSB. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT UNITED AIR-
LINES FLIGHT 232 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-1010
SIOUX GATEWAY AIRPORT SIOUX CITY, IOWA
JULY 19, 1989. [S.l.], November 1990. Dispon´ıvel em:
<http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR90-06.pdf>.
ORTH, A.; BARG, J. Reliability is required: new safety standards for
machine control systems. Control Engineering, p. M3–M5, 2010.
ORTH, A. et al. 10 steps to performance level. Handbook for the
implementation of functional safety according to ISO 13849. [S.l.]:
Bosch Rexroth AG, 2012. ISBN 978-3-9814879-2-3.
ORTH, A.; RAKSCH, C. Determination of reliability parameters
of hydraulic components for safety applications in industrial and
mobile machines. In: Proceedings of the 9th International Fluid Power
Conference (IFK). Aachen, Germany: [s.n.], 2014. v. 2, p. 144–153.
ORTH, A.; SWAGTEN, G.; SILVA, R. O. Contributions of functional
safety in the design of safe and reliable marine and offshore system.
In: BIOCOMBUSTI´VEIS, I. B. de Petro´leo Ga´s e (Ed.). Proceedings
of RIO OIL & GAS 2014 Expo and Conference. [S.l.: s.n.], 2014.
154
RAUSAND, M. Reliability of Safety-Critical Systems. [S.l.]: Wiley,
2014. ISBN 978-1-118-55337-4.
RIGDON, S. E.; BASU, A. P. Statistical Methods for the Reliability
of Repairable Systems. [S.l.]: Wiley-Interscience, 2000. 224 p. ISBN
978-0-471-34941-9.
ROUVROYE, J.; BLIECK, E. Comparing safety analysis techniques.
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, v. 75, p. 289–294, 2002.
SCHAERFER, M.; BORK, T. Tangible and transparent use of
reliability data for functional safety, ”the sense and nonsense of
quantification”. In: SIAS2007. [S.l.: s.n.], 2007.
SCHUMACHER, J.; Ru¨CKWART, W. Will it work? fluid power and
functional safety. In: Proceedings of the International fluid power
conference. Aachen: [s.n.], 2014. p. 488–494.
SKLET, S. Safety barriers: Definition, classification, and performance.
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, v. 19, p. 494–506,
2006.
TRAUFETTER, G. San Francisco: Crash ’Was
Only a Matter of Time’. July 2013. Dispon´ıvel em:
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/pilots-missing-
control-systems-led-to-san-francisco-crash-a-909956.html>.
